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INTRODUCTION 
The overall tendency has come to prevail in the increasingly intricate law-
making machinery that unlike in the customary law development it is wri t ten 
law which determines law-making organs, their powers, the hierarchy of law-
making acts, law-making patterns but particularly the types of State acts 
which may contain norms equally binding on individuals, their organizations 
and State organs. There is no agreement on the point what should be included 
in the constitution f rom among the rules governing the entire domain of law-_ 
making, wha t should come under Acts of Parl iament and lower-ranking sta-
tutes (e. g. government decrees). But it is a generally accepted demand tha t 
the basic institutions of the system of legal sources should be regulated in the 
constitution. 
The 1949 socialist constitution in Hungary drew a dividing line in this 
field. Earlier, when unwrit ten constitution was prevailing several major insti-
tutions of the system of legal sources were laid down in the rules of customary 
law. This implied the emergence of a spontaneous practice of law-making 
organs in a relatively wide sphere of the law-making mechanism. Af ter 1949 
the wri t ten constitution laid down the main trai ts and basic institutions of the 
entire system of legal sources. This constitutional regulation was likewise cha-
racterized by not precluding a fu r the r growth of the system of legal sources 
but also by barr ing the way to arbitrarily introducing institutions. At least it 
rendered more conspicuous, marked, endeavours directed at shaping a non-
constitutional practice. 
On the ground of the Constitution the process of a more detailed regulation 
of some institutions of the system of legal sources was started at a relatively 
early period. First, issues more of a technical nature relating to the publication 
of statutes were brought under regulation.1 But the necessity to regulate in 
detail problems connected with normative acts issued by central public admi-
nistrative organs, their place and rank in the system of legal sources arose 
rather early.2 A major advance was made in the regulation of that system in 
Law-Decree No 26 of 1954 and the concomitant Resolution of the Council of 
Ministers No 1074 of 1954 (IX. 4.) M. T. These statutes, utilizing experiences in 
the five years a f te r the adoption of the Constitution, went beyond mere tech-
nical issues also in regard to the highest-ranking statutes, Acts of Parl iament 
and Law-Decrees. The division between statutes bearing on civic rights and 
duties and other normative acts, the relationship between basic statutes and 
executive statutes was based on basic principles. In addition, provisions were 
1 Government Decree 4216 of 1949 (IX. 6.) M. T.; Government Resolution 2001 
of 1950 (I. 7.) M. T.; Law-Decree No. 22 of 1950, Government Decree 14 of 1951 
(I. 13.) M. T. 
2 Government Resolutions 1009 of 1951 (V. 6.), 1038 of 1951 (XII. 19.) M. T. 
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made on the safeguards of the legality of law-making. I t may be said tha t in 
the epoch of a relatively rapid transition important questions of the system 
of legal sources were settled in an up-to-date manner. 
This, however, did not mean as if the moulding, growth of that system 
had come to an end. Within the limits provided by the Constitution and the 
now-mentioned statutes, several enactments on some institutions of Sta te 
organization (on the judiciary, on procury, on councils, on the standing orders 
of Parl iament and the Presidium) and the codes in several branches of law 
(code of labour, Law-Decree on social insurance) have a bearing on insti tutions 
of the system of legal sources. 
Subsequent upon the adoption of the 1949 Constitution several papers and 
monographs dealt with the system of legal sources in Hungary. The problems 
discussed were conditioned mainly by the branch of science-theory of law, 
legislative technics, constitutional law — f r o m the angle of which law-making 
and its patterns were approached. 
Works of a legal theoretical nature were devoted in the f irst place to the 
traits characteristic of the system of the sources of law as a whole since they 
discussed problems of the sources of socialist law in the setting of the theore-
tical problems of socialist law. In this context, their interest focussed mainly 
on issues of the Hungarian system of legal sources which could be dealt wi th 
on the general theoretical plane of socialist legal development. It is also t rue 
that several Hungarian works on the theory of law have won international 
recognition in regard to problems connected with the system of the sources 
of law.3 
Writings on legislative technics are concerned mainly with the draf t ing, 
systematization and structure of statutes. Papers in this range serve mainly 
practical purposes but some of these arrive at conclusions of a theoretical 
nature in connections with the legislative forms i. e. the institutions of the 
system of the sources of law. This is the main reason why works on legislative 
3 Without attempting to give a complete list the most important works on the 
subject will be cited: Peschka, V. : Jogforrás és jogalkotás (Source of law and law-
making), Budapest, 1965. 497 p. The work starting from the fundamental questions 
of the concept of the source of law, after surveying the State and social elements 
of the legislative process, arrives at proposals ori the development of the system of 
the socialist sources of law. The author examines in his paper: Lenin és a szo-
cialista jog formái (Lenin and the forms of socialist law); Állam- és Jogtudomány, 
1970. No. 1. pp. 25—33., the correlations between the development phases of the 
socialist State and the moulding of the system of the sources of law. Szabó, I.: 
A jogszabályok értelmezése (Interpretation of statutes), Budapest, 1960. 618 p. The 
author, analysing the comprehensive issues of law interpretation arrives necessarily 
at the examination of the major theoretical problems of the system of the sources 
of law. (The work was published also in Rumanian: „Interpretarea Normelor Juri-
dice", Bucharest, 1969. In another work of his, „A szocialista jog (Socialist law)", 
Budapest, 1965. 454 p., the author devotes a chapter to the system of the sources of 
socialist law, the basic institutions of the system of the sources of law. (The work 
was published also in the Soviet Union under the title „Socialistitscheskoe Pravo". 
Progress ed. 1964—65. Szabó, I.: wrote also the chapter on the sources of law in 
the text-book of socialist law of the Strasbourg Comparative Law Faculty (Faculté 
Internationale pour l'Enseignement du Droit-Comparé), cf.: Introduction aux droits 
socialistes. Akadémiai Kiadó. 1971. pp. 89—127. The text-book „Állam- és Jog-
elmélet" (Theory of State and Law) outlines the system of the socialist sources of 
law through elaborating the socialist literature on the theory of law. Budapest, 
1970. pp. 463—491. (The relating Chapter was written by Szotáczky, M.). 
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technics are usually ranked among those on the theory of law.4 It should be 
noted that works on legislative technics came to be published af te r the adop-
tion of the 1949 Constitution at a relatively later phase, not before the middle 
'fifties. Af te r that period, however, papers on the major problems of the 
-legislative technique in the given phase were published practically in con-
nection with every major codification.5 
Works on constitutional law pay due attention to categories elaborated 
in the theory of state and law; they draw within their orbit of interest, by 
applying the comparative methods the patterns of legal sources adopted in 
foreign, in the first place socialist constitutions but concentrate on institutions 
and their growth in Hungary. In the period af ter the adoption of the consti-
tution works on constitutional law dealing with the problem, discussed mainly 
the system of legal sources as laid down in the Constitution and the statutes 
on its implementation.6 
By the middle 'f ift ies the generalization of experiences, as if preparing a 
comprehensive statute to be issued on the system of legal sources, then af ter 
the adoption of Law-Decree No 26 of 1954, monographs on the Hungarian 
system of legal sources indicate the rising standards of works on constitu-
tional law.7 
4 The close relations between law theory and legislative technics are discussed 
in detail by Braugye, J. L.: A törvényhozási technika kérdései (Questions of the 
legislative technics), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1958. No. 3—4. p. 113 et seq. 
5 When surveying the Hungarian literature on problems of legislative technics 
the discussion on the principle of law-making organized during the 1954 Academy 
of Sciences Annual Meeting should be pointed out. The introductory lecture was 
held by Miklós Világhy. cf. MTA Társadalmi-Történeti Tudományok Osztályának 
Közleményei V. k. No. 1—4., Budapest, 1954. pp. 216—217. A contribution to the 
codification of criminal law was a paper by Timár, I.: A kodifikáció kérdéseiről 
(On the problems of codification), Állam- és Igazgatás, 1960. No. 7. pp. 401—411. 
At the end of the 'sixties a contribution to a more efficient law-making connected 
with the reform of the new system of economic management was made by Ko-
rom, M.: A jogszabályok és az ügyintézés egyszerűsítése (Statutes and the rational-
ization of administration), Állam- és Igazgatás, 1968. No. 8., p. 675 et seq. Kampis, 
Gy.: A jogszabályok mennyiségéről és a jogalkotás trendvonalairól (On the amount' 
of statutes and the legislative trends), Állam- és Igazgatás, 1969. No. 9, p. 786 et seq. 
The paper contributes to assessing the legislative activity in certain periods by 
elaborating the figures relating to legislative activity and by comparing the amounts 
of various legislative levels. 
6 Pikler, K.: A jogforrások az alkotmány tükrében (Sources of law in the light 
of the Constitution), Állam- és Közigazgatás, 1949. No Sept-Oct. pp. 337—343. The 
paper discusses mainly the changes resulting from the written Constitution. Szamel, 
L.: Jogszabályszerkesztésünk néhány problémája (Some problems of statute-drafting), 
Állam- és Közigazgatás, 1950. No. 4—5. pp. 340—345.; the paper discusses the 
relation between the pre-liberation and post-liberation law-making and the problem 
of the statutes of implementation. Cilczer, Gy.: Jogszabályok, kötelező erejű hatá-
rozatok közzététele (The publication of statutes and binding resolutions), Állam- és 
Közigazgatás, 1950. No. 10—11, pp. 746—754. The author dealt, in addition to 
describing the system of publication, with various kinds of public administrative 
agencies' normative acts. 
7 Csizmadia, Gy.: Törvény és törvényerejű rendelet a Magyar Népköztársaság-
ban (Act and Law-Decree in the Hungarian People's Republic), Állam- és Igazgatás, 
1954. No. 3. pp. 155—167. Beér, J.—Szamel, L.: Minisztertanácsi rendelet — minisz-
tertanácsi utasítás (Council of Ministers' Decree — Council of Ministers' instruction), 
Állam- és Igazgatás, 1954. No. 6—7, pp. 401—406. Szamel, L.: A jogforrásokról és 
közzétételükről (On sources of law and their publication), Jogtudományi Közlöny, 
1954. No Nov-Dec. pp. 444—452. Szamel, L.: A jogforrások (Sources of law). Buda-
pest, 1958. 184 p. 
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Beginning with the 'sixties the number of papers pointing towards an 
evolution of the system of legal sources started to increase. Proposals were 
made to fu r the r its development by expanding the democratic legislative 
mechanism, i. e. by extending the role of Acts of Par l iament by separat ing 
f rom other statutes those on civic rights and duties, by extending the safe-
guards of the constitutionality and legality of law-making.8 
A number of proposals were adopted in the recent constitutional amend-
ment, enacted by Act No. I. of 1972. Later on taking into account the new tex t 
of the Constitution, Law-Decree No. 24 of 1974- on the promulgation and 
coming into force of the legal rules regulated again the principal questions 
of our system of souces of law on the basis of experiences gained dur ing two 
decades.9 This work will concentrate first of all upon matters concerning Acts, 
and Act-level legislation, i. e. Law-Decrees. But in this course, — due to their 
interrelation — some kindred' problems of government decrees and ministerial 
decrees will also be discussed. 
. I. DEFINITION OF LEGISLATION AND LEGISLATIVE SUBJECTS 
1. The problem of legislative subjects may be approached f r o m several 
angles. Thus e. g. it may be examined per se: what should at all be the 
subject of legal regulation, legislation. (In other words: where is the limit in 
the network of social conducts and social relations beyond which the law-
maker need not, must not or should not take action). The range of legislative 
subjects may be examined also within the context of social relations, social 
conducts, f rom the angle of differences between these relations and conducts, 
i. e. f rom the aspect of the types of legislative subjects, of how the social 
characteristics of these types react upon the method of regulation, sanctions, 
etc. Such an examination is e. g. when legislative subjects are discussed 
according to the particular aspects of various legal branches. Lastly, the range 
of legislative subjects may be examined on the ground of the State's uniform 
legislative function, analysing the extent of the domain reserved (or to be 
reserved) for regulation by Acts and the legal consequences attaching to it, 
within the increasingly differentiated law-making mechanism. 
The approach of the problem in the lat ter sense, i. e. f rom the angle of 
the State's uniform law-making function and in this context the differentiat ion 
between ,,Act-law" (legislation-made wri t ten law) and „non-Act law" (non-
legislation-made wri t ten law) may appear as an acceptance of the Act concept 
8 Kovács, I.: Democracy and Legislation. Annales Univ. Scient. Budapestiensis 
De Rolando Eötvös Nominatae. — Sectio Jurídica — Tom. VII. 1966. 37—49 pp.; 
Bihari, O.: A törvényhozás egységének értelme és formái a mai szocialista államban. 
(The porpurt and forms of the unity of legislation and execution in modern socialist 
States), Állam és Igazgatás, 1968. No. 12. 1057—1069. pp.; 1969. No. 1. 1—17. pp.; 
Kovács, I.: Les sources du droit de la République Populaire Hongroise. Revue inter-
nationale de Droit comparé, 1967. No. 3. 655—674. pp.; Kovács, I.: La notion de la 
loi, l'organisme législatif dans le systeme de droit actuel de Hongrie. Études en 
droit comparé, Budapest, 1966, 11—31. pp.; Kovács. I.: La division des attributions 
créatrices de droit dans le systeme des organes centraux de l'État, Droit hongrois — 
Droit comparé, Budapest, 1970. 219—233. pp. 
9 It is the resolution of the Council of Ministers No. 1063/1974. (XII. 30.) which 
provides for the enforcement of the Law-Decree. 
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in the material sense. It is known for students of the problem that the view 
according to which every generally binding s ta tute is an Act irrespective of 
•whether it has been made by a legislative body, the executive or public admi-
nistrative agencies is widespread in bourgeois l i terature but crops up some-
t imes also in socialist legal writings. It is clear tha t the so-called material 
concept of Act is used in socialist legal l i terature in a symbolic sense in order 
to demonstrate tha t there is no difference among statutes of various levels as 
regards binding force. Apart f rom the fact that this assumption itself over-
simplifies the issue (a legal rule can never be detached f rom the legal system 
as a whole) it must not be disregarded that the material concept of Act 
assumes, as regards its origins, the recognition of two independent law-makers. 
To put it in other words: it is based on a pat tern of the separation of powers 
found in the f i rs t constitutional monarchies. In this conception Parliament, the 
supreme representative organ, meant, as a legislator, the people, the nation in 
exercising legislative power. This idea was underlying its original legislative 
power. The Sovereign, the head of the executive had a share in the exercise 
of this power by its own right (or by the grace of God which is essentially 
only a symbolic expression of the same formula). The two parties — the 
Sovereign and the supreme representative organ — were juxtaposed in the 
exercise of legislative functions as partners with equal rights. This was the 
justification fo r placing, in principle, on the same level Acts and Decrees in 
the material concept of the Act. The differentiation made between legislative 
subjects in this pat tern indicated a restriction upon or the restricted nature 
of the Sovereign's powers. 
The problems relating to legislative subjects continued to be important, 
although with a completely changed content. In effect, these indicate, in the 
mechanism of the uniform State power, in the system of the hierarchically 
graded law-making organs the province of law-making allotted to the supreme 
representative body. This change in the assessment and importance of legis-
lative subjects is closely tied to the expansion in the set-up of the law-making 
process in the past hundred years. It may unequivocally be stated by now tha t 
the pat tern of exercising State power as practiced in the so-called constitu-
tional monarchies has become obsolete in toto. 
The doctrine which derives State power as a whole, legislative power 
included, f rom the people (electorate) has been practically generally accepted. 
This power is exercised, in the order laid down by the Constitution, by State 
organs (or in specific instances directly by the electorate). The regulation of 
the legislative power is always the central point in every constitution. The 
view that a yardstick of the democratic character of a constitutional system 
is the effective or potential participation and its extent in the exercise of the 
legislative power has been gaining ground lately. An international s tandard 
or minimum standard is now in a state of formation in this regard.10 
Parallel wi th this development also legislative functions underwent major 
changes. Law-making had increasingly become a device in the hands of the 
so-called active State in implementing political programmes in the economic, 
social, cultural, etc. domain. This development has not only widened bu t has 
also conspicuously differentiated legislative subjects. 
10 cf. Kovács, I.: A törvénykoncepció alakulása (The formation of the statute-
concept), MTA IX. Osztályának Közleményei. No 1, 1966. p. 75 et seq. 
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The differentiation in regard to legislative subjects had to have had an 
impact on the law-making organization, its methods and the growth of the 
forms in which law appears. It should be pointed out tha t the tradit ional law-
making organs, forms and methods evinced a considerable flexibility in the 
course of this development. It may be said tha t a considerable part of these 
became general elements of legal culture and are still capable, with relatively 
minor modifications, to meet contemporary demands within a wide sphere. 
This notwithstanding, there is a certain tension between the tradit ional law-
making means and contemporary demand. The causes of this tension are 
manyfold. In some instances this is rooted in the non-simultaneous emergence 
of new forms and methods and the changes in the functions of legal regulation. 
It also happens f reduent ly that traditional means are intended to be used 
although these are inadequate in the given situation. It is again a f r equen t 
occurrence that a legal fo rm is lent to the active State 's measures which 
have, in principle, no statutory content. Such actions, being pseudo-statutes, 
may discredit legislation. 
As a result of the diversity of the legislative material the number and 
types of organs engaged in legislative activity have been considerably in-
creasing. We are witnessing e. g. that organs which had participated formerly 
in the legislative process with different grades of delegated powers — but 
invariably with delegated powers — achieved independent legislative s ta tus 
in decree-making. In this course, the legislative authori ty of the Head of State, 
the government and members of the government has become increasingly 
distinct. Occasionally government-controlled organs which are not ministries 
or, what is more, minister-controlled central public administrative agencies a re 
vested with independent legislative powers. Besides, it is likewise a general 
tendency that professional organizations, interest federations have a role in 
the legislative process, sometimes with independent authori ty bu t mostly with 
binding or optional rights of consultation. The differentiation in the legislative 
mechanism is demonstrated by the ever-increasing range of subjects coming 
under local legislation. The general effort can be observed to bring legislative 
powers closer to the area to be regulated and to confer these on organs having 
more direct information on the social relationships coming under regulation. 
The fact tha t an increasing number of professional organizations and 
public administrative agencies have come to participate in legislation involves 
an added importance of the safeguards destined to secure the prevalence of 
overall interests against group interests and the particular interests of admi-
nistrative branches. Among these safeguards a very important place is oc-
cupied by the delimitation of legislative powers in the material sense, i. e. 
adjusted to legislative subjects and, within this, the determination of subjects 
which must come within the powers of the supreme legislative organs which 
are most capable of expressing general interests on the highest level and in a 
most abstract form. (It should be made clear tha t generail interests still mean, 
everywhere and every t ime class interests wi th a political purport). 
As regards the differentiation in legislative pat terns the evolution in t he 
course of which individual acts, general acts, abstract general acts and norma-
tive acts containing statutes have attained a separate existence is wor th 
noting. In addition, the resolutions which are not statutes either in f o r m or 
content but express a given political, economic, cultural or social programme, 
objective but which become, af ter publication par t of positive law mus t be 
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taken into account when discussing legislative patterns. They are taken into-
consideration either by law-applying agencies or a lower-level law-making is. 
based on them. On the other hand, the different kinds of acts, their intricate 
hierarchical interdependence, the practicability of several transitional patterns, 
between general acts and abstract general acts thrust into prominence the-
formation of an efficient and quickly acting organization which familiar w i th 
legal requirements (and confined within its limits) is able to fully enforce 
political requirements in securing constitutional and lawful legislation. Such, 
a controlling organization may work within the machinery of the supreme: 
representative bodies, the government apparatus or in other political set-up. 
In accordance with national constitutions it may work through ordinary 
courts, constitutional courts or the procuracy. Various solutions can also be^ 
combined. 
The safeguards of constitutional and lawful legislation serve, in the last-
analysis, the implementation of general interests even if sometimes they 
fur ther group interests for the very purpose to have the delimitation of 
powers enforced which express the most general interests. This applies p a r t i -
cularly to those legislative systems which took into consideration, at the-
outset in laying down legislative subjects or determining domains of legislation-
reserved for legislative organs the possibility of conflict between general 
interests and group interests and the resulting dangers. 
It is therefore necessary to place the entire range of problems to be 
discussed, i. e. not only those of legislative subjects but the relationship-
between Acts and Law-Decrees within the general f ramework now set forth. 
When elaborating up-to-date solutions in the first place experiences in socialist, 
countries should be taken into account.11 But not forgetting the numerous-
problems of legislative technique relating to the issue which raise analogous 
problems irrespective of social systems, experiences in contemporary bourgeois-
law-making should not be left out the consideration. 
2. In the course of the bourgeois States' evolution the problem of legis-
lative subjects was or is determined essentially by three essentially different 
conceptions which are or were the underlying principles of legislation. One is-
the so-called French revolutionary conception, the second is the Austrian-
German, so-called compromise solution, lastly the so-called historical concep-
tion, characteristic of the British evolution. 
According to the French revolutionary conception every general rule of 
conduct should, in principle, be formulated in Acts or at least regulation must 
be traced back to Act through a chain of delegations. Under this conception, 
the regulation of every social relationship is, in principle, a legislative subject. 
11 It is specially emphasized in recent Soviet writings on the theory of law that. 
,,in the socialist society where the State's activity is very wide" legal regulation, 
comprises a very differentiated system of social relations. The differentiated content 
presupposes differentiated forms. The scientific leadership of the socialist society 
provides an opportunity for coupling into a close system the differentiated forms 
where every, form of regulation is „in its proper place", in other words it may-
meet with the „maximum effectivity" the demands which require a legal regulation. 
The shaping of the most conducive forms of regulation and a determination of the-
forms in which social relationships should be regulated is a major task of juris-
prudence. (cf.: Marxistko—Leninskofe obsaja teorija i prava (Osnovnoje instituti i: 
ponyatija). Moscow, 1970. pp. -608—609. 
In default of special legislative authorisation decrees may contain but technical 
-rules of implementation. 
The essence of the Austrian—German conception is tha t everything with 
a bearing on citizens' property or liberty comes under legislation. This tenet 
"became widespread in the formulation that everything affecting citizens' rights 
and duties must be regulated in Acts. On the ground of this conception the 
-original law-making powers of the executive comprise e. g. the regulation of 
the internal conditions of State organization, of State institutions, etc. Under 
this conception the subjects coming under regulation by decrees is also 
-relatively wide. An overall definition of the range of legislative subjects is 
.always important for this conception because it marks the line of division 
-where the independent law-making powers of the executive end. 
The so-called Anglo-Saxon or historical conception holds tha t everything 
-once regulated by Acts must be again so regulated. Assuming the existence 
-of a legislation looking back at a long historical past this results in an almost 
-as wide a legislation as is the French revolutionary conception; still, i t should 
"be pointed out tha t the Biritish idea of legislation recognizes — although 
-within nar row limits — the legislative powers (prerogatives) of the Sovereign 
-relating to -colonial issues, some legal relations of civil servants, the Army 
-and certain other, well-defined topics.12 
In all three conceptions on legislation, besides defining legislative subjects, 
- the so-called exclusive legislative subjects are of importance: th is means a 
range of subjects to be regulated exclusively by Acts of Parl iament where no 
-decrees can be issued — not even through delegation or authorization or 
where authorization or delegation13 is exceptional and conditional, on special 
-restrictions. 
12 The independent legislative powers of the Sovereign had appeared in the 
rso-called Royal Prerogatives. Up to 1920 the Royal Prerogatives and Acts of Parlia-
ment were concurrent. After 1920 — by virtue of a decision of the House of Lords 
— if Parliament has adopted an Act in the field of Royal Prerogatives, the Act shall 
be governing, cf.: E. C. S. Wade—G. Godfrey Phillips: Constitutional law. Sixth 
^edition. Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1960. p. 175., p. 180., pp. 569—570 et seq. 
13' Article 34: All laws shall be passed by Parliament. Laws shall establish the 
-regulation concerning: 
— civil rights, and the fundamental guarantees granted to the citizens for the 
• exercise of their public liberties; the obligations imposed by the national defense 
upon the persons and property of citizens; 
— nationality, status and legal capacity of persons, marriage contract, inheri-
tance and gifts; 
— determination of crimes and misdemeanours as well as the penalties imposed 
-therefore; criminal procedure; amnesty; the creation of new juridical systems and 
the status of magistrates; 
— the basis, the rate and the methods of collecting taxes of all types; the 
-'issuance of currency. 
Laws shall likewise determine the regulations concerning: 
— the electoral system of the Parliamentary assemblies and the local assemblies; 
— the establishment of categories of public institutions; 
— the fundamental guarantees granted to civil and military personnel employed 
"by the State; 
— the nationalization of enterprises and the transfer of the property of enter-
prises from the public to the private sector. 
Laws shall determine the fundamental principles of: 
— the general organization of national defense; 
no 
Subject to the political conditions of States all three conceptions have 
h a d an impact in various periods and to varying degrees on bourgeois legis-
lative practice. Still, the conception termed as the French revolutionary one 
has gained, as pointed out earlier, general acceptance. At least the overwhelm-
ing majori ty of constitutions do not recognize the independent legislative 
powers of the executive but provide for the general requirement that law-
making must be based on Acts or at least on specific authorization under 
Acts. (By Acts always ordinary Acts are meant. Decree must not — as a 
ma t t e r of principle — be based directly on the Constitution). 
Although the general trends of development are well-known, it will 
perhaps be useful to list the variants of the relationship between the legislative 
a n d executive power. 
a) The government (and public administration), have, theoretically, no 
independent legislative authority; thus, the government (and public admi-
nistration) issue, theoretically, their law-making Acts by virtue of a certain 
Act the authorization contained therein, and in order to implement this Act; 
b) the government has independent law-making powers to regulate 
certain matters precisely defined by Acts; 
c) excepting legislative subjects defined in the Constitution or by legisl-
ation, the government has powers to regulate matters independently in do-
mains where regulation is lacking but it is necessary — until these subjects 
•come to be regulated in Acts. 
It is a characteristic of all three variants tha t the legislative powers of 
t h e supreme representative bodies are unlimited as regards legislative subjects, 
and decree-making is recognized to the degree and in regard to subjects not 
— the free administration of local communities, the extent of their jurisdiction 
and their resources; 
— education; 
— property rights, civil and commercial obligations; 
— legislation pertaining to employment, unions and social security. 
The financial laws shall determine the financial resources and obligations of 
the State under the condition and with the reservations to be provided for by an 
•organic law. 
Laws pertaining to national planning shall determine the objectives of the 
•economic and social action of the State. 
The provisions of the present Article may be developed in detail and amplified 
by an organic law. 
Article 37: Matters other than those that fall within the domain of law shall 
be of a regulatory character. 
Legislative texts concerning these matters may be modified by decrees issued 
after consultation with the Council of State. Those legislative texts which may be" 
passed after the present Constitution has become operative shall be modified by 
decree, only if the Constitutional Council has stated that they have a regulatory 
character as defined in the preceding paragraph. 
Article 38: The government may, in order to carry out its programme, ask 
Parliament to authorize it, for a limited period, to take through ordinances, measures 
.that are normally within the domain of law. 
The ordinances shall be enacted in meetings of the Council of Ministers after 
consultation with the Council of State. They shall come into force upon their pub-' 
lication, but shall become null and void if the Bill for their ratification is not 
submitted to Parliament before the date set by the enabling Act. 
At the expiration of the time-limit referred to in the first paragraph of the 
present Article, the ordinances may be modified only by law in those matters 
which are within the legislative domain. 
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regulated in Acts. If the state of emergency is disregarded, this is such a 
general trend that the solution adopted in the 1958 French Constitution which 
reverses this pattern must be regarded really acceptional. 
Under the 1958 French Constitution it is not Parliament, the supreme 
representative body but the government which is regarded the depositary of 
the original legislative power, and the legislative authority of the former if 
limited to subjects defined in the Constitution. This solution appears at f i rs t 
sight as completely alien to bourgeois constitutional development. This accounts 
for its being celebrated by Gaullists as a wholly novel solution. But a closer 
examination will show that this solution is, in fact, but a variant of t h e 
Austrian—German conception mentioned earlier as a compromise, brought 
up-to-date. This is borne out by a survey of the legislative subjects laid down 
in the Constitution. 
Three groups of legislative subjects are provided for in the Constitution: 
a) exclusive legislative subjects, b) legislative subjects in regard to their basic 
principles; c) legislative subjects specified by organic laws. All this is coupled 
with wide possibilities of authorization. The government may, when imple-
menting its programme, ask for authorization to issue decrees also in respect 
to legislative subjects. If the exclusive legislative subjects are examined, it 
will be seen that excepting the creation of public institutions and the regula-
tion of the status of civil servants may be considered legislative subjects also 
according to the Austrian—German conception. Legislative subjects in their 
basic principles include such classical domains like e. g. ownership, rights in 
rem and the whole field of civil law. It is not noteworthy that a large sphere 
of such a classical legislative field like civil law belongs not to the exclusive 
legislative subjects but only to those which belong to these only in regard to 
their basic principles. This conception is rooted in the Code Napoleon: „La 
propriété est le droit de jour et disposer des choses de la maniéré la plus 
absolue, pourvu qu'on n'en fasse pas un usage prohibité par les lois ou par 
les règlements" runs Section 544 of the Code. As is seen „decree" (règlement) 
was originally included in the sources of law laying down the limits of ow-
nership. It is likewise worth noting that the demand to make a distinct 
category of the so-called exclusive legislative subjects is coupled with the 
development of the Code Napoleon. In the 19th century relying Acts and 
judicial decisions decrees first by local authorities then by central agencies 
were banished from fields which affected the owners' right of disposal. It was 
on this analogy that the scope of exclusive legislative subjects came to emerge. 
For a better understanding of the contemporary French system the relevant 
parts of the constitution will be found in the Notes.13 
3. When discussing the general development trends in socialist countries 
it should be pointed out at the outset that the principle of unity of legislation 
and execution does not preclude the elaboration and recognition of legislative 
subjects. Originally the principle of unity of legislation and execution had 
emerged as a rejection of the separation of powers. It had meant simply a 
break with the conception under which efforts were made to keep apart the 
representative organs (bodies elected by the electorate) and public administra-
tion. This is why great emphasis had been laid from the first days of Soviet 
power on the full powers of elected bodies and concomitant with that, the 
theses that public administrative agencies are constituted by the represen-
tative bodies, it is the latter which determines the scope of authority, the 
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tasks of the former ; it is the representative bodies which may direct and 
exercise control over the work of public administrative agencies and moreover, 
they themselves may participate in public administrative activities through 
their plenary meetings, members and committees. At the beginning this pat-
tern involved an almost complete dissolution of the powers of public admi-
nistrative agencies in their relationship with their superior organs. Theoreti-
cally representative bodies could deal with any mat ter coming within public 
administrative authority, although the relatively early emerging institutions 
of dual subordination raised more differentiated demands also in this sphere 
in; regard to the local representative bodies. 
Subsequent developments brought with them a gradual division between 
the competences of representative bodies , and their public administrative 
agencies. This division came to preclude the direct intervention of represen-
tative bodies in public administrative affairs. Nonetheless, they could imple-
ment their ideas through their unlimited powers of control over and opportu-
nities to instruct the respective public administrative agencies. (In addition a 
number organizational and competence safeguards continued to secure the 
implementation of the full powers of representative bodies.) 
Whether earlier or latter stages in development are considered there 
will be found no pat tern in which the representative agencies' powers vis-avis 
public administrative organs were loosened. The latter may act in matters 
pertaining to representative agencies exclusively by virtue of a general (i. e. 
statute-granted) authority or given for specified matters. There are necessarily 
scopes in this domain where such an authorization is precluded or dependent 
on particular conditions. The wider or narrower dimension of these scopes — 
governed by the political conditions prevailing in a given period — is impor-
tan t for valuating the democratic aspects of the organization. 
4. At the beginning of the Soviet development resolute efforts are 
discernible to determine the scope of matters coming within the exclusive 
scope of authori ty of representative organs. Under the 1918 Constitution it 
was, in fact, not the Congress of Soviets but the Central Executive Committee, 
a permanently active legislative organ which was the „Soviet Parl iament". 
As provided in the Constitution it was working as „a legislative, disposing 
and controlling organ". The Council of People's Commissars was, according to 
the Constitution, as an organ of general administration. The Council — the 
Soviet government — had very wide powers but it was bound to submit 
everyone of its decrees and resolutions to the Central Executive Committee; 
in matters of major importance it was bound to sollicit its preliminary deci-
sion. It was only in cases of urgency and exceptional necessity that it had 
powers to act without preliminary decision (Sections 40—41). In the first 
constitutions — the period of war communism not excepted — the effor t to 
define exclusive „legislative subjects" and to allow the government to act in 
such instances only on the ground of particular authorization is clearly 
discernible.14 But it is also obvious that the emergency in the first years did 
not favour legal or constitutional restrictions. A very flexible mechanism was 
14 An interesting example is the Ukrainian Constitution adopted in March, 1919 
under which the relationships among the three Supreme State organs, the Soviet 
Congress, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of the People's Com-
missars were built on the complex system of exclusive legislative subjects, author-
izations and substitution. 
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emerging in the organization of the exercise of central power in which organs: 
could take action as substitutes — also in the legislative domain. And a s 
regards the problem of legislative subjects it could not arise in a clear form: 
for a long t ime simply because the Act, in its today's meaning, i. e. an act of 
the supreme legislative organ was introduced by the 1936 Constitution in to 
the hierarchy of Soviet legal sources. 
It is also t rue tha t Soviet legal l i terature and judicial practice used t h e 
concept of Acts also before tha t date but these were meant to be the legislative 
acts of the supreme organs, i. e. of the Central Executive Committee, t h e 
Presidium of the Central Executive Committee and, in certain fields even of 
the government (the Council of People's Commissars) and in certain periods 
also of other bodies (like the Worker-Peasant Defence Council, then t h e 
Council of Work and Defence, etc. in the ' twenties); but this use was n o t 
widespread and no efforts were made to define a particular concept of the Act-
On the other hand conscious efforts were made when the p repara to ry 
work of the 1936 Constitution was going on to base legislation on a single 
organ. In accordance with the 1936 Constitution only enactments adopted b y 
the Supreme Soviet as Acts are considered to be Acts. At the outset t h e r e 
was some uncertainty in this sphere. Sometimes every enactment adopted by 
the Supreme Soviet was regarded and termed as an Act — irrespective of 
whether or no it had a normative content. (Individual acts were also regarded' 
as Acts). But the practice that only enactments adopted by the Supreme Soviet 
as Acts and with a normative content are regarded as such, has taken root irt 
the past two decades. 
The 1936 Constitution brought about major changes also in other respects 
in the ideas on legislation. Start ing with 1936 the thesis has been tha t every 
public administrative organ — the supreme organ, the government included — 
shall not adopt statutes but on the ground of, in accordance with Acts, when: 
taking action to implement them. (The powers of the Presidium will be deal t 
with subsequently). Socialist legal literature holds this constitutional principle 
The Congress had exclusive powers as regards the adoption and amendment of 
the Constitution; the powers of the declaration of war and the conclusion of peace 
came likewise within the exclusive powers of the Congress with the proviso that 
if it is impossible to convene the Congress, these powers may be exercised also by 
the Executive Committee (Section 10). The overall direction of the government and 
State activity came also within the Central Executive Committee's powers. Its. 
exclusive powers covered the election and dismissal of the members of government 
(Council of People's Commissars), the distribution of State revenue among central 
and local organs, the regulation of the election and organization of local organiza-
tions, changes in the boundaries of the Republic, conclusion of international treaties,, 
the laying down of principles of socialist construction in the economic field (Section 
11); the Council of People's Commissars had powers to act in matters coming within 
the powers of the legislation and national „general direction" only on the ground 
of the „general or special authorization" of the Central Executive Committee. (Such 
matters were, as laid down in Section 6 of the Constitution, legislation on criminal, 
civil and procedural law, the direction of national defense and home policy, cur-
rency and the system of State control.) In default of such authorization the re-
solution had to be submitted to the Central Executive Committee for approval. The 
Council of People's. Commissars could not pass final resolutions, even if it had 
authorization, on matters coming within the powers of the Congress and the Central 
Executive Committee (Section 16). Otherwise the powers of central organs are 
comprehensively listed in Section 6 of the Constitution, (cf.: Istoria Sovietskoj; 
Konstitucii, 1917—1956. Moscow, 1957. pp. 193—194.). 
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identical with the reauirement that original law cannot be adopted but by the-
supreme representative organ — at least in the meaning that every statute-
must point back to an Act. The same idea is expressed — although in a 
milder formulation — by the tenet that the basic legal regulation of social-
conditions in all social spheres must come within a regulation by Acts. (The 
limits of local law-making and of the legislative authorization of local Soviets-
as representative-power organs is another problem). According to these theses 
every subject to be regulated is, in theory, a legislative subject. Whichever 
conception is accepted (that original law can be created exclusively in Acts 
or that the basic regulation of social conditions is a mat ter to be regulated in. 
Acts) the whole conception is a reasonable proposition only if the ordinary 
Act is meant by Act and if the requirement to regulate basic social conditions-
in Acts is not meant to be satisfied by claiming tha t the constitution, being a 
basic law, covers in any case, the entire network of social conditions or at-
any rate the most important of them. . 
Else, the principle that social conditions must be basically regulated in-
Acts is recognized — apart f rom a few exceptions — (which will be discussed 
subsequently) in socialist states, in part , under the effect of the Soviet 
Constitution and, in part, as a result of traditions in given countries and is-
ranged among the democratic legislative principles. If this conception is-
compared with earlier bourgeois conceptions it may be stated that it is neares t 
to the so-called French revolutionary idea of legislation which is held these* 
days to be generally accepted. There are jurists in socialist countries who*-
regard the two as identical. 
It is therefore another question whether Soviet law recognizes so-called 
exclusive legislative subjects or subjects explicitly reserved for legislation. 
This is a mat ter fo r constitutional regulation. There is reference in Section 14-
of the federal Constitution to legislative subjects which may be conceived of" 
as being exclusive subjects of legislation. These are: „legislation on judicial-
organization" and on „judicial procedure", „the criminal Code", „the civil-
code", „legislation on federal nationality", „legislation on the rights of foreign, 
nationals", „the establishing of the basis of legislation on family and matri-
mony", „the establishing of the basis of legislation on work". Other domains 
are also pointed out in this Section (e. g. on land use, the principles of the-
use of forests, waters, mineral resources) without, however, using the term-
legislation in this context; it is therefore difficult to consider these as exclusive 
legislative subjects. In any case, Section 14 as a whole does not envisage the-
definition of legislative subjects but a division of affairs between the Union 
sequences. (These subjects serve as guidance not for a division of legislative 
powers but for the separation of scopes of authority of the Union and the-
Federal Republics). 
There are references also in other Sections of the federal Constitution-
f rom which perhaps specific legislative subjects may be inferred. (E. g. refe-
rence to the order of recalling deputies as laid down in Acts). Taken as a-, 
whole, Republican constitutions take their pattern by the Federal Constitution. 
These include, however, certain special legislative subjects. Such is e. g. t h e 
and the Federal Republics and lists, in general terms, affairs coming within 
It is within this context that mention is made of the above „legislative sub-
jects". This f ramework restricts as well as delimits the attaching legal con-
the powers of the supreme Union power and public administrative organs 
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-determination of the budget in general; reference to local taxation in some 
-instances; legislation on family, matrimony, work. 
Either the Union Constitution or the Republican constitutions are con-
sidered, legislation came to cover practically a much wider area than the 
subjects referred to in the constitutions. Accordingly, a distinction can be made 
.also in Soviet development between categories of legislative subjects as laid 
down in the Constitution on the one hand and as shaped by legislative de-
velopments on the other. 
5. When examining the general development t rends in the constitutions 
of people's demoratic states it may be said tha t legislative subjects, wi th in 
.these, exclusive legislative subjects have had a major role to play f r o m the 
•outset. This fact is not always reflected in people's democratic constitutions. 
Some constitutions — mainly under the impact of the 1936 Soviet Consti tu-
tion — do not or hardly make mention of legislative subjects. In other con-
st i tut ions — partly due to the survival of bourgeois democratic tradit ions — 
(like the 1948 Czechoslovak Constitution) the scope of legislative subjects was 
relatively wide. Extreme solutions are found in the 1963 and 1974 Yugoslav 
•Constitutions where, due first to the federal nature of the State (but also in 
order to lend greater emphasis on the increased role and importance of the 
.representative organs) a large number of legislative subjects are listed. Even 
i f extreme solutions are disregarded and the general t rend is kept in mind, 
i t may be stated that constitutional developments in people's democratic states 
tend towards a growth in the number of legislative subjects. It is worthwhile , 
therefore, to discuss in more details f rom this angle one of the most recently 
.adopted socialist constitutions, the 197.1 Bulgarian Constitution. Altogether 
-about 40—50 legislative subjects are listed in this Constitution. The f igures do 
not, however, reflect without fail the volume of the scopes of regulation pro-
vided for. The veritable volume of the scopes of regulation is namely depen-
d e n t on the codification technics applied. As regards the Bulgarian Constitu-
tion, the provision in its Section 9 (1) that „the rights, liberties and duties laid 
down in the Constitution shall be exercised, respectively performed directly 
by virtue of the Constitution unless it is provided by the Constitution that 
the conditions and order of their implementation shall be determined by Acts", 
.had an effect on increasing the number of legislative subjects. It occurs, there-
fo re , f requently in the text of the Constitution that a subject appears in two 
places: once when the legal institution concerned is mentioned in a general 
•context (e. g. the judiciary) and again when some of its elements are refer red 
"to. In given cases, however, this doubling may be conceived as an additional 
safeguard. The possible intention was to lay a special emphasis on exclusive 
legislative subjects by mentioning part-institutions. In order to facili tate a 
bet ter comprehension the legislative subjects laid down in the Bulgarian 
-Constitution are described in the Notes of this work, grouped according to 
their nature (economic and ownership relations, State organization, civic 
rights.15) 
15 The overwhelming part of legislative subjects affect State organization. 
Accordingly, Act shall regulate the structure of the State Council (Section 78), 
.particularly the instances when the President of the State Council may be authorized 
to act on behalf of the State Council (Section 96), the organization of the Council 
•of Ministers, its tasks, the ministries, the creation of agencies of a ministry character 
(Section 78) the order of the election of representative organs (Section 76). the 
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6. In the development of legislation and legislative subjects in Hungary, 
the 1949 socialist Constitution means a clear-cut dividing line. Traditions, 
however, made their effect felt also on the post-1949 developments. 
a) A particular legislative pattern was shaped by developments in Hun-
gary. This t rend is accounted for by the fact that the powers of Parl iament 
representing the „nation" — against the foreign dynasty — and working 
without interruption became closely intertwined with the public law safe-
guards of the country's independence. Independent Hungarian legislation re-
presented, to all intents and purposes independence. This was the major 
reason why Acts enacted jointly by king and Parliament retained their 
central place among the sources of wri t ten law throughout the entire feudal 
age. Although there were periods when the Hapsburg kings were governing 
by means of ordinances and when these ordinances were constantly law-
infringing. Such practices were, however, always held by Parliaments and the 
local bodies of the ruling classes — the counties, — an abuse of power against 
which they were waging a consistent fight. It is therefore easy to understand 
why the nationalist movement counter-acting the absolutistic rule of Joseph II 
at the end of the 18 th century was so ready to adopt (and to support with 
special safeguards as a foundation of „feudal constitutionality" (the institution 
of representative legislation which was in the center of the constitutional 
ideas of the French revolution. It is also known for the students of the subject 
tha t the demands of the national opposition against the rule of Joseph II 
were laid down in the Acts adopted in 1790—1791. It is also known that the 
recall of deputies (Section 77), the rules applying in general to the Councils (Section 
78), the creation of council-type local administrative organs (Section 119), the 
entrusting of social organs with State activity (Section 78), the overall rules on the 
judiciary (Section 78); in this scope public administrative matters coming under 
judicial supervision (Section 125), the creation of judicial organs other than courts 
(Section 26), the determination of matters which can be handled without the parti-
cipation of lay assessors (Section 127) are singled out as special legislative subjects. 
Lastly, under Section 131 of the Constitution, Act shall regulate the exemption of 
special judicial organs from the supervision of the Supreme Court. Act shall 
regulate the organization and working of the Procuracy (Section 135) and the part 
on the administration of justice provides that crime and penalty must be regulated 
by Act. (Section 136). The same applies to the organization, jurisdiction and compe-
tence of the judiciary, the order of determining court districts, the procedure in 
court, the conditions, order and time of the election, reporting and recall of judges 
and lay assessors. 
Many economic subjects are singled out in the Constitution: in addition to the 
national economic plan and budget (Section 78) the property which may be owned 
by social organizations and cooperatives (Section 16) is specially mentioned. The use 
by co-operatives and individuals of forests, pasture, waters, mineral resources 
(Section 178), the scope of economic activity by social organizations (Section 20), the 
scope of small-scale production (Section 21), the limits of personal property (Section 
21), small private industrial or agricultural activity based on individual work 
(Section 25), expropriation and compensation (Section 28), economic activity pursued 
exclusively by thé State (Section 29), the conditions of changing the use of agri-
cultural trend (Section 30), taxation (Section 64) (but government organs and co-
operatives excepted) are all legislative subjects. 
In the domain of civil rights legislative subjects are labour safety (Section 32), 
nationality (Section 34), the conditions of social assistance (Section 43), the con-
ditions of free schooling (Section 45), the limits of the privacy of homes, (Section 
49) ; the legal status and internal self-government of religious denominations (Sec-
tion 53), damages by official persons and the conditions of their compensation 
(Section 56), military service (Section 62). 
2 Kovács Acta 17 
idea of modern constitutionality first appeared in these Acts. It is Act No X 
of 1790—1791 which uses first the te rm constitution: it is laid down there tha t 
Hungary is a country independent f rom every other people, having an 
existence and constitution of her own. Act XII of 1790—1791 is part icularly 
important for legislation and legislative subjects: the initial indications of a 
separation of the legislative and executive powers are contained in it. Act 
No XII of 1790—1791 reaff i rmed the important principle laid down in s ta tutes 
of earlier centuries that legislative power in Hungary shall be vested jointly 
in the lawfully crowned king and Parliament. A novel provision of this Act 
is that government by „decrees or patents" shall be prohibited. Under Act 
No XII of 1791 the enactment of decrees or patents was restricted to „affa i rs 
in conformity with Acts" and it provided specifically: „the King shall exer-
cise executive power not otherwise but in conformity with Acts." The same 
Act also provides for some important safeguards of judicial independence. 
(The juxtaposition, in this sense, of the legislative, executive and judicial 
power indicates an initial endeavour at separating these powers). The circum-
stance that the safeguards laid down in the Act were not progressive insti tu-
tions but were created to protect old feudal privileges does not alter the fact 
that they were destined, at the time, to secure the country's independence. 
This pattern of the exercise of supreme power was completely at variance 
with systems adopted in other areas of the Hapsburg-empire. The resulting 
contradictions became soon obvious. In Hungary the Acts of 1790—1791 and 
the system of the legislative and executive powers laid down in them provided 
the legal ground for the protests of the Hungarian counties in the post-Napo-
leon period, in the Europe of the Holly Alliance, against government by 
decrees. It is less well-known but worth pointing out tha t in the twenties of 
the 19th century (mainly under the impact of European movements growing in 
intensity as a result of the Spanish revolutionary actions) Emperor Francis I 
was compelled to call Parl iament first in 1825 than at regular intervals 
because patents and decrees of no lawful foundations and running counter to 
Acts were regularly disobeyed. It is no exaggeration to say that it was • the 
constitutional safegaurds of legislation which compelled the Emperor to call 
the reform Parliaments.16 The period of the reform Parl iaments was closed by 
the 1847—1848 Parl iament and the revolutionary Acts adopted by it. 
16 The emergence of the national resistance and its impact was very appropria-
tely described in the 'sixties of the last century in Gedeon Ladanyi's constitutional 
history. „ . . . all the counties made petitions surprised and pained. They submitted 
that after the Royal Oath and the well-known great sacrifices they expected 
something quite different, recalling Acts No 12 of 1971 and Act No IV of 1504 
(which declares the county collecting taxes levied without Parliament's consent 
ignoble), and that they could not comply with the decree. The Royal Court must 
have been aware that this was to be the next result of the decree and therefore it 
had made plans what to do to silence the counties. It ordered the execution in a 
new decree, clearly stating that in case of further disobedience it will resort to 
coercive measures. Both have occurred. Royal commissioners with full powers were 
sent to all the disobedient counties; they had military forces at their disposal; the 
more courageous protectors of the laws were indicted for high treason. But all this 
only increased the counties' resolution and upheaval in the country; the situation 
was becoming increasingly similar to what it had been at the end of the reign of 
Joseph II. The increasingly bold voice and even opposition of the nation shocked 
the King the more because the Greek revolution brought about a cleavage in the 
Holy Alliance. Under such conditions King Francis did not dare to drive the nation 
into revolution, he made concessions; he gave up the dangerous course and called 
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The Acts enacted in March, 1848 provided for a constitutional monarchy 
but did not repeal the Acts of 1790—1791. It was the more so because this 
Act provided a f ramework for all the institutions of the constitutional mo-
narchy which were susceptible of meeting the new requirements of bourgeois 
social development. Parl iament in 1848—1849 adopted no stand on the volume 
of legislative power. It may be inferred f rom the system of the exercise of 
power — and this was a requirement inherent in the safeguards of the 
country's independence — that it was nearest to the conception of Acts which 
was described earlier in this work as the French revolutionary idea. At least 
there is no indication of recognizing the independent legislative powers of the 
King, respectively the government. But it should be pointed out that these 
are mere inferences; clear, unequivocal stand was not adopted on this point. 
But the whole problem of legislation and legislative subjects cropped up when 
it came to interpreting the 1790—1791 Acts, in the constitutional debates 
preparatory to the Compromise of 1867 with the Hapsburgs. A central issue of 
Ferenc Deak's polemical essay17 on constitutional law was the contrasting of 
different concepts of legislation and legislative subjects. This contrasting is, 
of course, not conscious since in Deak's time the three conceptions were not 
precisely distinguished in jurisprudence. 
If the whole debate is reviewed it may be said that Vencel Lustkandl 's 
work „Das ungarische-osterreichische Staatsrecht" (against which Deak wrote 
his polemical paper, strives to lay the ground, relying in the main on what 
was termed by the present author, the Austrian—German concept of Acts, 
for a real union in which Hungarian legislation would have been restricted 
to matters affecting citizens' liberty or property. On the other hand it proposed 
that every other subject some within the Emperor's independent legislative 
powers, in other Words these matters should be of an imperial concern.18 But 
Parliament for September 11, 1825". (Gedeon Ladányi: A magyar alkotmány törté-
nete, II. kiad. [History of the Hungarian Constitution], Debrecen, 1869. p. 223.). 
The lyrical description is also a document that the feudal class mobilized the 
nobility, just as in 1790—1791, to protect privileges. 
17 Deák, F.: Adalék a magyar közjoghoz (Contribution to Hungarian public law), 
Pest, 1865. p. 188. 
18 Lustkandl's work serves the theoretical grounding of such a real union in 
which the overwhelming majority of State affairs are „common", imperial concern. 
He starts from the theoretically mistaken stand that everything which came within 
the „powers" of the King of Hungary is at the same time „imperial affair". In 
order to substantiate his view and to be able to excessively extend the scope of 
imperial affairs, pre-1848 Hungarian legislation is surveyed with an unequivocal 
purpose. Pre-1848 „Royal" powers are extended mainly in two directions. On the 
one hand the so-called „regalia" (custom and jexcise, finances, salt monopoly, mail, 
mining rights etc.) and the Royal prerogatives in foreign affairs and national 
defense are made to appear as if they had been sovereign rights independent from 
Parliament; on the other hand he gives a deliberately false interpretation to Act 
No. XII of 1790 on the exercise of the legislative and executive power. This Act 
namely while imposing a ban on government by patent lays down, as a separate 
safeguard, that this would not in any case be accepted by Hungarian courts. From 
this provision he concludes — by using a contrario arguments — that only matters 
which can be brought before court can be qualified as legislative subjects 
(... „welche in den ungarischen judiciis zur Sprache und Verhandlung kommen 
könnten"), next he excludes from the domain of legislative subjects the entire 
public law conceived in the wider sense, with the exception of criminal law, by 
asserting that this regulates constitutional relationships while there is no constitu-
tional court in Hungary. In point of fact, in his view, only private law and criminal 
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Deák. adopting the conception termed above as historical proved, by adducing 
examples f rom the past of the several hundred years old Hungarian legislation 
that the concept according to which legislation is not concerned with a con-
siderable number of State affairs was always alien to Hungarian constitu-
tional law. He proved that under Hungarian constitutional law and the his-
torically moulded Constitution based on it subjects once regulated by legis-
lation continue to be legislative subjects unless legislation itself refers them 
to decree-making authority. By hinting at the possibility of limiting the scope 
of legislative subjects, Deák offered a „golden bridge" for the Compromise 
with the Hapsburgs without, however, explicitly recognizing the independent 
legislative powers either of King or government. At the end of the century 
and at the beginning of the 20 th century many writings on constitutional law 
dealt with problems affecting legislative subjects. All three conceptions were 
reflected in l i terature: the French revolutionary conception (according, to 
which the government 's independent legislative powers should be limited to 
isssuing decrees of implementation by virtue of Acts), the Austr ian—German 
as well as the historical conception. The official view came to be crystallised 
round the historical conception but went much fu r the r than what Deák's con-
cessions implied and recognized, within a relatively wide scope the inde-
pendent legislative powers of King and government. These independent and 
original powers were justified by the elaboration of the category of wha t was 
called, the Act-substituting decrees. Three types of such decrees were 
distinguished in l i terature: a) decrees based on authorization by Acts; b) 
decrees filling gaps in Acts (aimed at fully implementing the purposes of the 
Acts concerned; c) decrees on subjects in place of Acts „the regulation of 
which is desirable but were left unregulated by Acts". The recognition of the 
last two types was essentially tantamount to an acceptance of the government 's 
original legislative powers and was a complete break with the French revo-
lutionary conception reflected in Act No XII of 1790—1791. 
To trace the development in the l i terature on constitutional law in respect 
of the very ideas on legislative subjects between 1867 and 1914 would be 
extremely interesting. But we must limit ourselves to singling out only ma jo r 
turning points. Some of Deák's ideas have already been described but it should 
be added now that his polemical paper was concentrating in the first place 
on refuting Lustkandl's conception and he used mainly historical examples. 
It may be seen f rom his observations made in this course that Deák was 
inclined to accept the concept of Acts described as the French revolutionary 
one in interpreting Act No XII of 1790—1791. In his view subjects not 
regulated in Acts should not be regulated in decrees save in cases of urgent 
necessity or in a state of emergency, (or at least he did not consider the re-
gulation in decrees of social relations not regulated in Acts as the normal 
course of the legislative process).19 Essentially such ideas are found in post-
1867 works on constitutional law. Ferenc Bouer holds that the government 
law would remain within the scope of legislative subjects, i.e. matters which affect, 
in the strictest meaning of the term, citizens' property and freedom, cf.: Lustkandl, 
W.: Das ungarisch-österreichische Staatsrecht. Wien, 1863. p. 498. The regalia are 
discussed on p. 20 et seq., the interpretation on Act No XII of 1791 is given on 
p. 208 et seq. 
19 cf.: Deák, F.: Adalék a magyar közjoghoz (Contribution to Hungarian public 
law), Pest, 1865. p. 154 et seq. 
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had no powers to take action on subjects reserved for legislation while in 
regard to other subjects it had powers to issue Act-substituting or Act-supple-
menting decrees when it is „urgently" necessary. . . „but the restriction must 
prevail also in this field that as scon as possible the government must submit 
the relating Bills to the legislative body",20 „the government has powers, in 
the public interest, to fill the gaps and deficiences in Acts by decrees — but 
only when it is impossible to expect legislative action because conditions 
demand immediate remedying which cannot be delayed" . . . says Imre Kor-
buly21 „in respect of subjects which are not covered by Acts or the Acts in 
force are deficient it is the government 's duty to remedy deficiences through 
decrees if state interests demand action brooking no delay, on account of 
urgency, until Acts are adopted in the required direction" says István Kiss.22 
At the turn of the century Act-substituting and-supplementing decrees are 
regarded as parts of the normal legislative process and no „urgent necessity" 
is required to issue them — can be read in works on constitutional law. In 
other words the powers of the government to regulate subjects not regulated 
in Acts by decrees is recognized.23 This view means an unequivocal break 
with the concept respectively requirement that, as a mat ter of principle, every 
social relationship should be regulated primarily by legislation. Concomitant 
with this changed concept is the emphasis on the significance of legislative 
subjects with the addition that these restrict the scope of Act-substituting 
decrees. Legislative subjects were defined at the outset unequivocally in con-
formity with the Austrian—German conception. „In decrees by which the 
government regulates subjects, not regulated in Acts, new burdens which can 
be determined by virtue of constitutional custom only by legislation, shall not 
be imposed on citizens; neither shall their liberty be curtailed in government 
decrees by restrictions not provided for earlier by legislation."24 
In the course of the public law struggles af te r the turn of the century 
constitutional issues were lent a particular emphasis. Accordingly, matters 
affecting the constitution came to occupy the principal place among subjects 
which could not be regulated by decrees. Kálmán Molnár distinguishes several 
groups of legislative subjects in a monograph20 covering the whole area of 
the relating problems: a) procedural and substantive private law; b) procedural 
and substantive criminal law.; c) constitutional law (the last mentioned area is 
ra ther difficult to determine when unwrit ten constitutions are concerned. 
Usually it was thought to comprise rules on principal State organs, i. e. the 
Head of State, Parliament, government, basic institutions of local self-go-
20 Bouer, F.: Magyar államjog (Hungarian constitutional law), Budapest, 1877. 
p. 209. 
21 Korbuly, I.: Magyarország közjoga illetőleg a magyar államjog rendszere (The 
public law of Hungary or the system of Hungarian constitutional law), Budapest. 
1884. p. 313. 
22 Kiss, I.: Magyar közjog (magyar államjog). (Hungarian public law [Hungarian 
constituional law]). Budapest, 1888. p. 20. 
23 cf.: Nagy, E.: Magyarország közjoga (államjog), III. kiad. (Public law of 
Hungary, constitutional law), Budapest, 1897. p. 323 et seq.; also VI. ed. Budapest, 
1907. p. 355 et seq. 
24 cf.: Balogh, A.: A magyar államjog alaptanai (Basic doctrines of Hungarian 
constitutional law), Budapest, 1901. p. 289.; also in the Kmetty, K.: A magyar köz-
jog kézikönyve (Handbook of Hungarian public law), Budapest, 1900'. p. 25 et seq. 
25 Molnár, K.: Kormányrendeletek. Tanulmány a magyar közjogból. (Govern-
ment decrees. Study on Hungarian public law), Eger, 1910. p. 185. 
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vernment and political rights). These areas were considered at the outset as 
exclusive legislative subjects and decree-making on authorization was deemed 
also to be restricted in these fields. Views, however, which agreed to decree-
making by virtue of authorization also in these fields became soon widespread. 
Kálmán Molnár, in his above-cited work, made an at tempt to define the main 
scopes of operation of the so-called Act-substituting decrees also in a positive 
direction. 
In his view, in the first place public administrative law and the overall 
build-up of State organization and its uninterrupted improving were so rapidly 
shifting areas where government decrees must necessarily have a ma jo r role 
in law-making. In adopting this view he in fact, substantively justif ied a 
category of law-making acts adopted by the government within its powers to 
which the term „Act-substituting decree" could hardly be applied anymore.20 
No new elements were added to these conceptions by legislation in the 
inter-war period. Law-making practice resorted to the means of authorization, 
of state of emergency, and the Defence Act to introduce such a „flexible" 
law-making and legislation which was always susceptible of meeting the 
given demands of the ruling classes.27 
b) As regards matters of principle, post-war developments in public law 
did not — up to the adoption of the 1949 Constitution — affect the earlier 
system of legislative subjects. Essentially all subjects regulated by uninter -
rupted legislation prior to or a f te r 1945 were regarded legislative ones. 
Authorizations granted to the government and affecting also legislation reflect 
also a certain differentiation among legislative subjects. In fact, the government 
relying on a December, 1944 Resolution of the Provisional National Assembly 
regarded itself to have been authorized — up to December, 1945 to adopt 
decrees in the entire legislative domain different f rom Acts in force. 
Act No XI of 1945 (adopted in December, 1945) when it restricted the fu l l 
authorization of the government (based on a Resolution of the Provisional 
National Assembly in December, 1944) excepted f rom the scope of authoriza-
tion Acts enacted by the Provisional National Assembly and the regulation of 
the State's „supreme power organization and its working". A fu r the r restric-
tion was imposed by Act No VI of 1946 under which public law relations — 
not including decrees on securing budgetary balance — were excepted f r o m 
the authorization. A continued differentiation of legislative subjects is reflected 
26 cf.: Molnár, K.: op. cit. p. 83 et seq. 
27 To support this statement let some conclusions of Tomcsányi, M. the „offi-
cial" constitutional lawyer of the age, made in 1943, at the end of that age, be 
quoted. „In general, the most important matters, namely the material of constitu-
tional law, private law and criminal law, cannot be regulated but by Act. (Legis-
lative subjects), cf.: Tomcsányi, M.: Magyarország közjoga (Public law of Hungary), 
Budapest, 1943. p. 77. „The so-called Act-substitutive or Act-supplementing decree 
takes lastly the place of the missing Act, it is a substitute for a letter in its entirety; 
accordingly it may be resorted to when there is no Act but the matter must be 
brought under regulation and the regulation otherwise comes within the govern-
ment's powers. All these are so-called law-making decrees which are unlike service 
instructions. The government, as has been already expounded earlier in connection 
with the concept of Act, has no powers to issue decree on every matter. There are 
matters the regulation of which is reserved under the Constitution for the legislative 
organ (legislative matters, legislative subjects). These matters can be regulated by 
government decree only by virtue of a special authorization by legislation", op. cit. 
p. 82.). 
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in Act No XVI of 1946 which imposed additional restrictions on the govern-
ment's authorization in dual direction. On the one hand it allowed decree-
making in the legislative scope only for certain specific purposes — „the -
government may, in order to secure economic order, budgetary balance and 
the undisturbed working of public administration, take action by decrees ne-
cessary in the exceptional situation coming otherwise within legislative powers 
and may adopt decrees at variance with "Acts in force". On the other hand 
the range of subjects which should not come under decree-making powers are 
determined in more detail. By virtue of the authorization laid down in this 
Section decrees at variance with Acts adopted by the National Assembly and 
such of public law nature, changes in the public administrative organization, 
enactment of new crimes or introduction of penalties graver than those laid 
down in Acts shall not be allowed save in order to re-establish .budgetary 
balance and to secure public supply." 
c) The adoption of the 1949 Constitution caused changes in the earlier 
legislative system insofar as owing to the introduction of the Presidium, which 
is a substitute of Parliament between its sessions, legislative authorization for 
the government became unnecessary and certain subjects of regulation were 
laid down in the Constitution as exclusive legislative subjects. (These are 
identical with earlier legislative subjects.) 
The issue to what an extant did the Constitution affect the government's, 
earlier recognized law-making powers should be discussed as a distinct prob-
lem. It should be stated at the outset that the Constitution does not explicitly 
provide for the topic. Unlike other socialist constitutions it does not use the 
phrase that the government issue decrees by virtue of Acts, in the implemen-
tation of the latter; but it does not contain a contrary provision either. In 
fact it laid down a flexible system which affords possibilities to recognize the 
government's independent law-making powers, in the initial phase of transi-
tory conditions, in the period of rapid social changes, at least in phases when 
the emerging new and rapidly shaping conditions require legal regulation but 
the relevant Acts are lacking. On the other hand constitutional provisions do 
not bar the shaping of a law-making system, in keeping with the expansion 
of socialist relationships (and its backing by safeguards below the constitutional 
level) in which social relationships should, as a matter of principle, be basically 
and primarily regulated by Acts. 
Subsequent amendments to the Constitution did not affect the substance 
of these provisions. It is another question that the uninterrupted legislative 
activity restricts, of necessity, automatically the scope of such powers by 
widening the area of social relationships regulated by Acts. Statutes declaring 
certain subjects explicitly legislative ones point likewise to the restriction of 
the government's independent law-making powers. Among such statutes should 
be mentioned e. g. Law-Decree No 26 of 1954, Section 3 under which new 
crimes cannot be provided for but in Acts or Law-Decrees. Parliamentary 
Resolution No 1 of 1956 also widened the scope of legislative subjects by 
providing: „Basic issues affecting the working people as a whole shall be 
regulated in Acts. Accordingly, a widening of legislative activity in a sense 
that statutes affecting citizens' basic rights and essential duties shall be Acts 
is absolutely necessary. 
These provisions are reaffirmed, in a somewhat changed form but essen-
tially with identical content in Government Resolution No 2004 of 1969. There 
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are provisions also in other Acts which widen the range of subjects to be 
regulated exclusively, or as to their principles in Acts.28 Among these should 
be mentioned Act No II of 1967 (Labour Code) Section 8, under which basic 
questions connected with labour relationships shall be regulated in Acts or 
Law-Decrees. The recent amendment to the Constituion provided for a par t 
of the new demands. 
Taking into account all what has been said on the issue the following 
types of legislative subjects can be distinguished now: a) legislative subjects 
laid down in the Constitution; b) scopes of regulation set for th in Acts or 
Act-level legislation explicitly as legislative subjects; c) legislative subjects 
shaped in the course of uninterrupted legislation; d) so-called new subjects 
of regulation. This is the case when social relationships regulated earlier in 
decrees come to be regulated by Acts. This happened e. g. when the Act on 
Co-operative Farms was adopted. 
Legislative subjects set for th in the Constitution are grouped around th ree 
sets of issues. The definition of exclusive State ownership and of the State 's 
exclusive economic activity in connection wi th the ownership and economic 
relations; the basic t rai ts of enterprise organization, economic plans, budget . 
Within the scope of State organization, the creation of ministries, the legal 
status of the members of the Council of Ministers and state secretaries, t he 
mode of their accountability, rules on the councils as representative organs, 
rules on the judiciary (in this domain Chapter V of the Constitution ment ions 
also other legislative subjects, like the establishment of special t r ibunals , 
exceptions f rom trial by divisions in court, the election of judges, exceptions 
f rom trial in public) rules on the procuracy. In connection with basic civic 
rights the Constitution mentions specially the election and recall of Par l ia-
mentary deputies and council members; it is also provided in Section 54 in 
general terms that rules on basic civic rights and duties shall be regulated in 
Acts. The content of this provision covers a wide field. It could be also so 
interpreted tha t it applies, in general, to basic rules on civic rights and duties. 
From the fact, however, that that provision is included in the Chapter on 
basic rights and duties, the unequivocal conclusion should be drawn tha t a 
detailed regulation of the rights and duties in this Chapter should be done 
by means of Acts. 
It is a problem to be decided what consequences are involved when a 
subject to be regulated is declared a legislative subject by the Constitution. 
The proper answer in all probability is that such a subject must be held an 
exclusive legislative subject. Accordingly, the entire domain must be regulated 
by Acts. As a fu r the r consequence, the decrees of implementation relating to 
such Acts must be of a purely technical nature, Acts cannot authorize a lower-
ranking law-maker to issue a detailed regulation. If, therefore, electoral system 
is regulated in Acts, the decree of implementation shall not contain Act-
substituting or — supplementing provisions, not even by virtue of authoriza-
tion under the Act. This is easy to understand since the electoral Act, being 
an ordinary piece of legislation, cannot amend the constitutional provision 
28 On the development of the scope of legislative subjects see: Kovâcs, I.: La 
notion de la loi, l'organisme législatif et la matiere législative dans le systeme de 
droit actuel de Hongrie. Étude en droit comparé, Budapest, 1966. pp. 11—33.; Kovâcs, 
I.: La division des attributions créatrice de droit dans le systeme des organes 
centraux de l'Etat. Droit Hongrois-Droit Comparé. Budapest, 1970. pp. 219—236. 
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under which a subject must be regulated exclusively by legislation. It is. 
another mat ter if not the entire range of regulation but only the relating, 
basic institutions or principles are laid down in the Constitution as legislative-
subjects. 
If a subject to be brought under regulation is not set for th in an explicit 
form as a legislative subject in the Constitution but in Acts or Act-level 
statutes, i. e. Parl iamentary resolutions or Law-Decrees, this also involves, 
legal consequences in respect to the detailed statutes of implementation. In 
such instances a general reference to the decree of implementation will not-
suffice; if the legislator deems the enactment of supplementary statutes in 
the implementation necessary authorization should be laid down in the 
detailed rules of the Act. In given cases namely legislative subjects defined in 
Acts are concerned. This is unlike the former case when the legislative sub-
ject is defined in the Constitution: in such an instance the legislator has 
powers to lower its authority in regard to certain details. This must, however, 
be stated clearly by the legislator himself. Accordingly, a general reference to 
the rules 'of implementation is inadequate. 
The case is essentially similar to what has been now described when a. 
legislative subject, not regulated earlier in an Act, comes under regulation. 
In such a contingency the legislator itself must make provisions if, in the 
decrees of implementation, provisions detailing or supplementing those of the-
Act are envisaged by it. 
The situation is ^basically different as regards the so-called new subjects 
of regulation. A characteristic feature of such subjects is that a former Act-
level statute is lacking; when a simple reference is made in such instances to 
the decree of implementation this involves an authorization praeter Legem i. e.. 
to issue decrees supplementing the Act. 
II. DELIMITATION OF THE SCOPES OF REGULATION OF ACTS 
AND LAW-DECREES IN THE EUROPEAN SOCIALIST STATES 
1. The term Law-Decree (its foreign equivalents included) is used in a. 
variety of meanings. It happens e. g. that government decrees which are a 
substitute for Acts are termed „Law-Decrees" in legal literature.29 In o the r 
.29 The Hungarian literature on jurisprudence is relatively rich in works-
discussing, on a comparative basis, the Presidiums, their emergence, evolution and 
acts in socialist States. First Ádám, A.'s work: A Népköztársaság Elnöki Tanácsa. 
(The Presidium of the People's Republic), Budapest, 1959. p. 307. should be pointed 
out which examines the functions of the Presidium in Hungary in the context of 
the socialist form of government making suggestions, generalizing the experiences, 
of socialist constitutional evolution, to expand its forms of action, particularly to 
make a distinction between Act-amending Law-Decree and other Law-Decrees. Data, 
obtained in the course of recent evolution are also elaborated, cf.: Ádám, A.: Az. 
Elnöki Tanács hatáskörének fejlődése (The development of the Presidium's powers). 
Állam és Igazgatás, 1967. No. IV. pp. 310—323 and No. V. pp. 424—435. Theoretical 
issues connected with distinguishing such an activity and an organization as a 
distinct type of organ was examined in connection with the usually known Pre-
sidium-activities in socialist States by Kovács, I.: A szocialista alkotmányfejlődés új 
elemei (New elements in the evolution of socialist constitution), Budapest, 1968. p. 260' 
et seq. The problem is discussed in connection with the system of popular repre-
sentation and the exercise of sovereignty by Bihari, O.: A szocialista államszervezet 
alkotmányos modelljei .(The constitutional models of socialist State organization),. 
Budapest, 1969. p. 190 et seq. 
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-words, the decree is based directly on the Constitution and there is no ordinary 
.Act on which the enactment of a decree could be based. In such instances it 
will be the decree which will contain the primary, basic regulation of the given 
social relations, which otherwise would come under regulation by Acts. 
A. more widely pursued practice is that executive decrees containing, by vi r tue 
•of authorization under Acts, provisions at variance with Acts in force, are 
.also termed Law-Decrees. In like manner decrees issued by heads of States 
(or governments) in a state of emergency and invoking the general au thor -
ization for such a state and containing provisions at variance wi th Acts in 
force are also termed Law-Decrees. The de facto existence of Law-Decrees 
issued in a state of emergency is recognized also when the Constitution does 
not provide for such a state and when the head of the State (or government) 
assumes responsibility for issuing Law-Decrees at variance with Acts in force 
in a state of emergency. This was the case e. g. in the historical Hungar ian 
•Constitution at the tu rn of the century. Emergency decrees were an unknown 
institution for the Constitution while the major i ty of constitutional lawyers 
held that the possibility of de facto issuing such decrees could not be denied. 
In such a contingency, it was professed, the supreme state organs responsible 
for issuing such Law-Decrees could be held responsible subsequently, re-
spectively they could be relieved of responsibility — as if substituting subse-
quently the authorization. Otherwise the most classic form of Law-Decree was 
"the decree issued by the supreme representative of the executive power, head 
of the State, king, emperor or the president of the Republic, (as te rmed in the 
French law which had the most momentuous impact on Continental laws: 
décret-loi). The varieties now described all concern the acts of the executive 
o r at least a principal State organ distinct f rom the supreme representat ive 
"body. In addition, it is not immaterial either that the major i ty of instances 
relate to forms of legal sources given rise to by special circumstances. Con-
sequent ly conclusions drawn f rom such forms cannot, as a rule, be applied to 
Law-Decrees as defined in the Constitution and to the corresponding or 
kindred institutions of socialist countries either. This is mainly accounted for 
by the fact that in the given cases a) acts issued not by the government or 
"the executive but by one of the supreme representative organs are concerned 
and b) this form of legal source appears not only in exceptional situations but 
In the normal conduct of State affairs. This is a major difference even if we 
are aware that the shaping of the institution was coupled also in socialist 
States with special conditions and a part of Law-Decrees are justified even 
today by the presence of special considerations. 
It should also be borne in mind that this institution is not uniform in the 
socialist countries either. There are many common features but it may also 
be stated that divergences are found not only in the institution itself but also 
in its working in socialist countries. 
The next parts of the work will discuss in detail the rise and development 
of this institution and its relation to the Act in the Soviet Union and the 
"European socialist countries in general; Hungarian developments and pro-
posals on fu r ther course will also be discussed. In the course of the whole 
^discussion the position of the organ authroized to issue Law-Decrees in the 
State organization, its relation to the supreme representative organ and, 
-sometimes its function in the political system of the given country mus t also 
be looked at. The functioning of the Law-Decrees, their role in law-making is 
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ziamely often conditioned by the development of organs authorized to issue 
Law-Decrees, their role in the State organization or the political mechanism 
.as a whole. 
2. In the Soviet Union the relation between Acts and Law-Decrees be-
came apparent as late as 1936 — just because there were earlier law-makers 
of several grades enacting act-level statutes. This problem has already been 
indicated in the preceding pages. This notwithstanding, a study of earlier 
•epochs cannot be dismissed mainly because the existence, characteristics of the 
Presidium's ukases particularly Act-amending ukases could not be understood 
without doing so. 
In the Russian Federal Socialist Republic in the initial epoch af ter the 
•October Revolution, the permanent legislative organ, the Central Executive 
.Committee was practically permanently working. On account of its large 
membership and the fact that it was composed of various social strata, social 
organizations and their delegates made it susceptible of functioning as a 
veritable Soviet Parliament.30 The Presidium of the practically permanently 
working Central Executive Committee discharged very important tasks of 
organization in preparing sessions, in draf t ing resolutions (it happened f re -
quently that the exact wording of a resolution or statute was adopted not by 
t h e Central Executive Committee itself but the Presidium was entrusted to 
formulate, on the ground of the discussion and promulgate the f inal text). 
Still, the Presidium had no powers to act for the Central Executive Com-
mittee. It was only in 1919 and 1920, when the constitutional amendments 
were adopted during the war communism that the Presidium came to have 
powers to act for the Central Executive Committee without, however, making 
the Presidium a distinct State organ. 
The first, 1924 Constitution of the Soviet Union had thus adopted an 
institution already shaped by then, when it laid down the substitutive powers 
of the Presidium of the Soviet Union's Central Executive Committee. It was 
concomitant with this process that the two-chamber system of the Central 
Executive Committee introduced by the 1924 Constitution started a process 
-of separation between the presidential body conducting the discussions in the 
respective chambers on the one hand and the Presidium on the other. 
- The 1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union went forward in this direction 
.and the Presidium obtained an independent standing, distinct f rom the officers 
of the two chambers of the supreme Soviet. By adopting this pat tern the type 
of Presidium obtained an independent standing, distinct f rom the officers of 
the two chambers of the supreme Soviet. By adopting this pat tern the type 
of Presidium which is in no part identical with the presidential bodies 
conducting the discussions of the supreme representative organ — even if the 
designation which was indicative of the earlier arrangement was retained 
unchanged. 
When one is aware of this development it will be easy to understand that 
when the 1936 draf t Constitution was presented the emphasis was not on the 
role of jthe Presidium as an organ securing the uninterrupted exercise of the 
30 It is worth pointing out that at the II Soviet Congress (November, 1917) 101, 
at the III Soviet Congress (January, 1918) 105, at the IV Congress (March, 1918) 200, 
at the V Congress (July, 1918) 207, at the VI Congress (November, 1918) 207 members 
.and associate members were elected to the Central Executive Committee, (cf.: Sjezdi 
sovietov v postanovlennijach i rezoljucijach, Moscow, 1935. p 528.). 
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supreme power but on its being a „collective head of State". The Pres id ium 
is so described in the rapporteur 's address on the dra f t Constitution: t he 
substitutive powers of the Presidium are not even mentioned in it. Only the 
opposite variants of „individual head of State" or „collective head of S t a t e " 
were dealt with in the address, drawing the ult imate consequence tha t t he 
institution of the collective head of State is more democratic because it p ro-
vides guarantees for the country against the occurrence of undesirable chance 
happenings. This accounts also for the fact tha t the Constitution does not a t 
all recognise the general substitutive powers of the Presidium but i temizes 
these powers and the overwhelming majori ty of the duties so listed remain 
within the limits of the functions of a head of State. The original in tent ion 
that the Presidium was conceived not as „an organ securing the continuous 
exercise of the supreme power" but as a veritable collective head of State i s 
borne out by the first draf t of the 1936 Constitution submitted to a nat ional 
discussion. Under this draf t namely the Presidium had no legislative powers 
at all; its powers would have been limited to law interpretation: „by issuing 
the appropriate ukases it shall interprete the Acts", — is set for th in Section, 
49/B of the draft . 
Subsequent developments, however, did not conform to the new ideas as 
laid down in the draft . Already when the Constitution had been adopted t h e 
wording now mentioned was so changed that the new formulation could be so 
interpreted as to include independent legislative powers as well. The f ina l 
wording runs: „the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union: 
shall interprete the Acts of the Soviet Union in force, shall issue ukases".3 ' 
On this ground, af ter the elapse of a relatively short period, immediately in 
the pre-war, i. e. in an undoubtedly „non-peaceful" period, a practice came 
to be pursued under which the Presidium was regarded to be authorized t o 
issue independent legislative acts, going beyond interpretation — assuming a 
subsequent approval by the Supreme Soviet. The consequences of this pract ice 
were drawn in the amendment of the above Section in 1946 under which t he 
powers to issue ukases and the interpretation of Acts became separated also» 
in the arrangement of the text. As a result of the 1946 amendment the re levant 
par t of Section 49 of the Constitution was so changed: „Section 49. The P r e -
sidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union: a) shall convene t he 
sessions of the Supreme Soviet, b) shall issue ukases, c) shall issue in te r -
pretation on the Acts of the Soviet Union in f o r c e . . . " 
Pursuant to these constitutional provisions the practice which regarded 
the Presidium as an organ essentially substituting the Supreme Soviet in t h e 
general legislative domain was fu r the r widening. These substitutive powers 
are very extensive by now. These include not only the amending of the Acts 
31 But the relevant part of the rapporteur's address bears out that not even this 
change envisaged that the Presidium have powers to issue Acts with a. force of law 
even with a temporary effect. The relevant part of the address runs as follows: 
„the next amendment relates to Article 40; in this it is proposed that the Presidium 
of the Supreme Soviet be given powers to issue temporary Act-type documents. 
In my view this amendment is inappropriate and cannot be accepted by the 
Congress. It is time to put an end to the state of affairs when Acts are adopted not 
by a specific organ but by a number of organs. This state of affairs runs counter 
to the principle of the stability of Acts. And we need stable Acts more today than 
at any time before. Legislative powers must be exercised in the Soviet Union 
exclusively by a single organ the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union". Stalin: 
A leninizmus kérdései (Questions of Leninism), Moscow, 1945. p. 556. 
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in force but cover respectively covered in some instances also constitutional 
amendments. 
Legal l i terature at the beginning simply ignored this practice. 
Later, when this practice had been pursued for a considerable period and 
survived the post-war epoch at tempts were made to just ify it by theoretical 
arguments, to give appropriate explanation. It was mainly the emphasis on 
the temporary character of such statutes and on the subsequent approval (or 
the lending of a force of Act in the ordinary legislative process) resorting to 
which theory justified the constitutionality of this practice. The most compre-
hensive argument may be so formulated that the Presidium is the depositary 
of supreme State power, State sovereignty between the sessions of the supreme 
Soviet, de facto and de jure accountable to and controlled by it. On the other 
hand, legal literature, when striving to lay the theoretical foundations for 
these general substitutive powers, always places into the foreground its limi-
tations or at least the importance to observe these limitations. 
In the next pages the issues of major importance for the subject now 
discussed, viz. the participation of the Presidium in the highest-level (Act-
level) legislation, some forms of this participation and, in this context, the 
limitations of the substitutive powers (this will provide an answer in respect 
to the relation between the Presidium's Act-level legislative enactments and 
the Acts) will be dealt with separately. Lastly, the trends relating, as a con-
sequence on substitutive powers, to the composition and working methods of 
the Presidium will be indicated. 
Attention should be drawn in the first place to the fact that the Presidium 
of the Supreme Soviet participates in Act-level legislation not only by enacting 
ukases. 
First, the Presidium's resolutions should be mentioned which display the 
Presidium's participation in the preparation of Acts. The Presidium has a part, 
through organs of its own, and relying on the committees of the Supreme 
Soviet concerned in the preparation of major Bills. It reviews the draf ts 
before they are submitted to the Supreme Soviet and sometimes it adopts a 
resolution on presenting such dra f t for a national discussion. It authorizes the 
committee (or committees) concerned to include in the draft , before its 
submission to the Supreme Soviet, proposals summarized f rom such national 
discussion and deemed worthy of consideration. In recent years, e. g. the 
Presidium adopted resolutions on the draf t Act on the „basis of the land-law 
legislation of the Soviet Union and the Federal Republics", the d ra f t of the 
basis of water-resources Act, the draf t of the basis of the public health Act, 
on the legal status of the Soviet delegates, etc. Although the resolutions of 
the Presidium adopted in connection with the control of the implementation 
of certain Acts are not directly legislative measures, they have an indirect 
impact on the State's legislative activity as a whole. The Presidium namely — 
acting invariably within its substitutive powers for the Supreme Soviet since 
the Constitution does not mention such a special function of the Presidium — 
places periodically on its agenda the examination of the practical implemen-
tation of some important Acts. A characteristic case of such resolutions is 
„on the practical implementation of the basis of the family law legislation of 
the Soviet Union and the Federal Republics".32 
32 cf.: Resolution No. VIII—1363 of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of 
the Soviet Union on the report prepared by the law-drafting committees of the two 
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The resolutions connected with the Presidium's directing and supervisory-
junctions over the local Soviets — adopted likewise within its subst i tu t ive 
powers for the Supreme Soviet — are a particular type. These resolutions 
include explicitly legislative ones. Thus, e. g. the sample statutes of the district 
Soviets, u rban and urban borough Soviets were adopted by a resolution of 
the Presidium. 
Again a particular type of the Presidium's resolutions are those on t h e 
interpretation of Acts in force, in accordance with Section 49 (c) of the Con-
stitution. The unequivocal view is professed in Soviet legal l i terature t h a t 
these resolutions, af ter having been published, became parts of the Acts con-
cerned. These resolutions, being acts issued within the Supreme Soviet 's spe-
cial powers need not be presented for approval to the Supreme Soviet. I t 
should otherwise be pointed out that the number of resolutions explicitly on 
Act interpretation is very small. There are no more than 1—2 such resolutions 
adopted in a year. The obvious reason for this practice is that the in te r -
pretation of Acts is normally coupled with other provisions detailing, supple-
menting or possibly amending Acts. In such instances not resolutions b u t 
ukases (normative ukases) are adopted. (It is well-known that the overwhelm-
ing majori ty of the Presidium's individual acts are issued in the- fo rm of 
ukases. As regards their official designation there is no difference between 
ukases on individual cases and normative, i. e. law-making ukases. This is t h e 
reason, among others, why the term ukase cannot be translated 'as Law-
Decree.) 
The study of the Soviet legal literature and the Presidium's acts leads t o 
distinguishing several types of the normative ukases. Usually, Act interpret ing, 
Act detailing, Act concretizing, Act supplementing, Act substituting and Act 
amending ukases are distinguished. (Constitution-amending ukases, being no t 
a general type, are not included deliberately.) These types, however, may be 
divided into two principal types depending on whether they are or are not 
subsequently approved in the form of Acts. Ukases issued within the Presi-
dium's own powers are regarded those which do not go beyond interpret ing, 
concretizing, detailing Acts in force, which are consequently not submit ted fo r 
approval to the Supreme Soviet. These ukases are so considered in the Soviet 
legal l i terature that these „fur ther the implementation, practical application" 
of the given Act. Most" writers admit tha t in some instances such ukases 
contain several new norms. The complexity of the problem is increased by 
the lack of delimitation (or its problematic nature) between the scopes of 
authority not only of the Supreme Soviet and the Presidium but also t he 
Presidium and the government in the domain of law-supplementing ukases. 
The latter problem is reflected in literature more in an indirect form. (The 
law-making functions of the government and the Presidium are f requent ly 
defined in an identical manner.) Act supplementing, Act substituting, Act 
amending ukases are always submitted to the Supreme Soviet for approval; 
This approval is made always in the form of Acts. In instances where t he 
supplement or amendment introduced by the ukase is of major importance, 
the respective ukases are approved by Acts. (These are, as regards their fo rm, 
Houses of the Supreme Council of the Soviet Union on the practice of the applica-
tion of the bases of the Soviet Union's and Federative Republics' Family Law 
Legislation. (Vedomosti Verhovnogo Sovieta SSSR, 1971. No. 13. p. 144.). 
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full statutes which, in given cases, regulate entire fields of subjects in at 
Code-like manner.) 
It is in connection with the Act substituting and Act amending ukases 
where the problem of the relationship between the Presidium's and the 
Supreme Soviet's scopes of authority arises. Some writers profess, having in-
mind the actual position, the unlimited nature of the Presidium's substitutive-
powers. The general view, however, emphasizes the limitations of the substi-
tutive powers or at least it draws attention to the importance of these l imita-
tions on the ground that single cases should not be exaggerated, and starting; 
from an exaggerated generalization no conclusions should be drawn on t h e 
unlimited nature of the Presidium's substitutive powers. The great major i ty 
of writers who discuss the relation between the Presidium and the Supreme 
Soviet adopt the view that full powers pertain only to the Supreme Soviet. 
The Presidium cannot exercise full powers between the sessions of t h e 
Supreme Soviet either. It was particularly in connection with the Act amend-
ing ukases where the limited nature of the Presidium's powers — compared 
to those of the Supreme Soviet — was elaborated. It is a general limitation on. 
Act amending ukases that they cannot be adopted but between the Supreme 
Soviet's sessions. The view that such ukases cannot be adopted between 
meetings but only between the closing and opening of sessions — in instances 
when this is justified by urgency and the convening of the Supreme Soviet 
does not appear to be conducive — is unequivocal. It may be concluded f rom 
all what has been said that the Presidium's Act amending ukases are not 
regarded in Soviet legal literature as a part of the general legislative process.. 
Those writers who justify the adoption of ukases in urgent necessity (or when, 
the convening of the Supreme Soviet does not appear to be conducive) amend-
ing Acts in force (or, incidentally, some constitutional provisions) invariably 
emphasize that these are statutes issued within substitutive powers for the 
Supreme Soviet, which are essentially temporary (although binding), which 
become final Acts after approval by the Supreme Soviet. The „temporary" 
character of such statutes is borne out by the wording of several ukases. It 
happens e.g. that it is provided in the ukase: until approval of the ukase by-
the Supreme Soviet, earlier statutes may be applied — provided they do not 
contravene the ukase to be approved. (This was the case e.g. in respect of the 
ukases on district, urban, urban borough Soviets.) No doubt, such provisions 
appear to be more in the nature of furthering the execution, implementation 
of the statute concerned; but they also support the view on the temporary 
character of the statutes concerned. 
It is also worth paying attention to the fact that views according to which 
the limitation of the Presidium's Act amending powers adjusted to subjects, 
through defining exclusive legislative subjects, may be inferred f rom the 
Constitution in force, are encountered in Soviet legal literature practically 
after the first Act amending ukase had been adopted. Proposals according to 
which such limitations — by appropriately interpreting the Constitution — 
can be introduced within the framework of the Constitution in force come-
also- within this category. A proper apparaisal of these views is made difficult 
by the fact that proposals, ideas connected with the interpretation of the 
Constitution and the limitations according to subjects which can really be-
inferred from the Constitution are frequently intertwined. The argument in-
voking the force of custom is also frequent. Such an argument is e.g. that the 
"budget of the Soviet Union had always been discussed in, and adopted by 
~the Supreme Soviet; consequently this must be included within the legislative 
.subjects stricto sensu. When all the relating views are compared exclusive 
subjects which cannot be regulated by the Presidium's Act amending ukases 
.may be so listed: a) amendment of the Constitution; b) admission of a new 
Republic into the Soviet Union; c) national economic plan; d) budget and 
final accounts, taxes and revenue from which federal, republican, and local 
budgets are f inanced; e) amendment of and supplement to the basis (basic 
principles of legislation laid down in the Constitution); f) Acts as a whole, 
•codes, or their basic institutions. (The general view prevails that only par ts of 
Acts can be amended); g) regulations on the elections to the Supreme Soviet; 
h) in addition to the subjects now listed, which appear on a Union level, there 
are exclusive legislative subjects in Federal Republics: adoption of codes, Acts 
-on judicial organization, regulation of the local Soviets, rules on the elections 
to the Supreme and local Soviets, the fixing, in accordance wi th federal 
legislation of State and local taxes, rates, revenue.33 
If the actual legislative practices of the Presidium and the Supreme 
Soviet are compared, it will be clear that the Presidium has become a legis-
lative organ by now and the volume of statutes enacted by it (even if some 
•of these are of a temporary character until approved by the Supreme Soviet), 
exceeds the number of statutes adopted by the Supreme Soviet. It may be 
said that, as a result of developments af ter the 1936 Constitution the Presi-
dium's function, its role in the State organization, has been undergoing gradual 
changes. Unlike the ideas at the beginning when the Presidium's head of 
State functions were emphasized, a supreme power organ, a narrower Pa r -
liament is unfolding, which is a substitute of the Supreme Soviet wi thin a 
relatively wide scope. The principal task of the „little" or „narrower" Parl ia-
m e n t might be so formulated that it discharges Act-level legislation (i.e. a 
higher level than that of government decrees) acting as a substitute for the 
very large and not mobile Supreme Soviet, under the latter 's control so as to 
•combine stability of statutes with a flexible legislation. If this conception is 
•carried fu r the r consistently (and institutionalized) raising it to constitutional 
level this would involve the elaboration or definition of exclusive legislative 
•subjects in the strictest meaning of the term. In other words, such a course 
would mean such a consciously shaped system of the highest-level legislation 
where only the major guarantees and basic institutions would be laid down 
in Acts while the Act-level legislation proper would be performed — within 
the limits of Acts adopted by the Supreme Soviet — by the Presidium, 
working as a „little Parliament". 
There have been aspects discernible in the Presidium's working methods 
which point, to a degree, toward a „little Parl iament". Thus e.g. the contacts 
between the Presidium and the organs of the Supreme Soviet have been 
increasing. The Presidium's meetings are attended by the presidents of the 
two Houses who have a right of consultation. Since the Supreme Soviet relies 
33 cf.: J. N. Kuznecov: K voprosu o juridicheskoj prirode ukaza Prezidiume 
Verchovnogo Sovieta SSSR i ego sootnosenii s zakonom Voprosi sovietskogo gosu-
•darstvennogo prava, Moscow, 1959; pp. 227—273.; Teoreticheskie voprosi sistematizacii 
sovietskogo zakonodatelstva. Moscow, 1962. pp. 113—132.: L. Lazarev: Sootnosennije 
zakona i ukaza. Sov. Gos. Pravo, 1965. No. 5. p. 65 et seq.; - A. V. Mickevitsch: 
•O formje aktov Prezidiuma Verchovnogo Sovieta SSSR Pravovedennije. Leningrad, 
1967. No. 3. pp. 57—66. 
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on more extensive system of committees than earlier, the Presidium's role, 
between sessions, in coordinating, organizing and guiding the committees was 
repeatedly emphasized. The committee chairmen likewise attend, with a right 
of consultation, committee meetings. This r ight belongs also to the chairman 
of the Council of Ministers, ministers, the Procurator-General and the Pre-
sident of the Supreme Court. The fact that representatives of the Party 
Central Committee, of major organizations (e.g. the National Council of Trade 
Unions, Central Committee of the Komsomol) also attend the Presidium's 
meetings with a r ight of consultation considerably extended the Presidium's 
contacts with the political mechanism as a whole.34 The relatively large number 
of persons attending with a right of consultation and its bearing on the 
Presidium's work and working methods can best be appraised if we are aware 
that the Presidium itself has a large membership which consists now of the 
President, 15 Deputy Presidents — representing 15 Federal Republics — the 
secretary and 20 members, altogether 37 persons. Else the tasks connected 
with the draf t ing of Acts and control over their implementation, already 
mentioned, indicate the „little Par l iament" development of the Presidium 
(or its prospective development). 
3. Thé course during which" the organization securing the continuity of 
supreme power was particular in every people's democratic country. This has 
a bearing also on the characteristics of Law-Decrees or corresponding sources 
of law. This justifies, to be able to point out experience susceptible of gene-
ralization, to discuss, one by one, the solutions as they are today. It should be 
mentioned at the outset that with the exception of Poland and Hungary major 
changes occurred in all countries in the organizations of the exercise of 
supreme power, its functions, the role of the statutes enacted by them in the 
legal system; accordingly, a proper appraisal of the contemporary situation 
demands the pointing out of variants as they have developed. 
a) In Poland there is a Council of State with a relatively small membership 
(President, 4 deputy-presidents, secretary, 12 members). Under the Constitution 
the President of the Seym and his deputies may be elected to the Council of 
State. (This means a particular emphasis on the relationship between the Seym 
and the Council of State.) The Constitution specifies the Council of State's 
powers in regard to: statute interpretation (Section 25/1/3); issuing Law-
Decrees within its own powers (Section 24/1/4); c) issuing Law-Decrees 
between the Seym's sessions (Section 26/1); The Constitution terms the Law-
Decree-irrespective of whether it is issued by the Council of State in its 
substitutive or proper powers — as „dekret z mocza ustawy" — decree with 
the force of law. This provision is the foundation of the Council of State's 
powers to issue Act-amending decrees. (Such decrees must be submitted to 
the Seym's next session for „approval").35 As regards Law-Decrees, their number 
34 The working methods of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the Soviet 
Union are discussed in detail in a collective work on the structure, organization and 
forms of activity of the supreme representative organs. Vissije Predstavitelnije 
organi o vlasti v SSSR (Red.: D. A. Gajdukov), Moscow, 1969. pp. 113—124. 
35 The relationship between Acts and Law-Decrees, its evolution in the Polish 
People's Republic is outlined and analysed in detail by Rozmaryn, St.: Ustawa w 
Polskei Rzeczypospolitej Ludovej, Warsaw, 1964. pp. 122—126.; The evolution of the 
making of Law-Decrees and their patterns in the two decades after the war is 
described by Zakrzevsky, W. : Dzialnosc Pravotvorca o Mocy Ustavy w Polsce 
Ludovej, Cracow, 1963. pp. 7—66. 
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is very low (last year e.g. one Law-Decree was issued). Law-amending Law-
Decrees were not issued in recent years. According to direct information th is 
is so secured that the Seym is convened for longer sessions — even if long 
period has elapsed between sessions. If Act-level legislation is needed, it is 
easier to convene meetings than sessions. In fact, in 1972 about 40 Acts we re 
adopted. True, the major i ty of Acts do not reflect' the veritable weight of 
legislation in law-making. There are many amending Acts and it also happens 
that related subjects are regulated in 2 or 3 Acts. 
The institutions of the Socialist Republic of Rumania should be discussed 
in more detail. 
For the subject now studied, the problem of Acts and Law-Decrees the 
solution in Rumania is interesting because there exists and is working para l -
lelly a very active legislation while the number of Law-Decrees is also 
significant. 
In Rumania the Council of State works in accordance with the 1965 
Constitution, amended several times since. The 1969 amendment was par t i -
cularly important. As a result of the amendments the State Council of Ruma-
nia has a relatively large membership by now: president, 4 vicepresidents, 
secretary, 22 members, altogether 28 members. A sharp distinction is made in 
the Constitution between the State Council's own and substitutive powers. 
The State Council has, as provided, powers to issue „norms" having the force 
of Acts only in its substitutive powers for the Great National Assembly. These 
powers are very wide. Between sessions of the Great National Assembly the 
State Council may amend Acts in force — constitutional- amendments excepted. 
The views in Rumanian legal writings that the State Council has original 
legislative powers identical with those of the Great National Assembly are 
connected with this regulation. But emphasis is laid also on the differences. 
While the Great National Assembly acts within its „ordinary" powers wh e n 
it makes original law, the State Council acts within „extraordinary" powers; 
the decision of the Great National Assembly means in such instances a „final 
legislation" or the norm-making having the force of law by the State Council 
is „provisional", in other words it becomes f inal af ter approval by the Great 
National Assembly.36 There are also other restrictions. The now-mentioned 
wide norm-making powers having a force of law are based on Section 64 of 
the Constitution. Under its provisions the State Council shall exercise the fol-
36 The temporary character of the Law-Decree is very strongly emphasized in 
Rumanian writings on constitutional law. According to a writer e.g. Law-Decrees 
cannot amend Acts. Insofar a Law-Decree contains a norm at variance with an Act, 
this only suspends temporarily the application of the Act's norms, substituting for 
the suspended norm of Act a lower-ranking norm, the one contained in the Law-
Decree, until the Law-Decree is approved by an Act. According to this view, this 
applies also to the case if the Great National Assembly refuses approval. In such a 
contingency namely it is unnecessary to adopt again the norm of Act repealed by 
the Law-Decree; the refusal of approval terminates the operation of the Law-
Decree and automatically restores the suspended norm of Act. The relating views 
are summed up in: Dumitrescu, A. T.: Natura juridica si efectele „decretelor cu 
putere de lege" in raport cu prevederile constitutionale. Rivista Romana de drept, 
1970. No. 10. pp. 60—66. The recently published text-book of constitutional law does 
not adopt this view, adducing the argument that such a construction does not solve 
legal consequences following from the application of the norm „temporarily in 
force", in case the Law-Decree is not approved, cf.: Draganu, T.: Drept Constitu-
tional, Bucharest. 1972. p. 394. 
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lowing powers between the sessions of the Great National Assembly: 1. I t 
shall convene the Great National Assembly; 2. It shall have powers to enact 
statutes with force of Acts (norme cu putere de lege) without amending the 
Constitution. The statutes shall be. submitted, in accordance with the procedure 
of adopting Acts, for discussion to the f irst session of the Great National 
Assembly. The State national economic plan, the State budget and the general 
final accounts of the fiscal year shall not be adopted by the State Council 
unless, owing to extraordinary circumstances, the Great National Assembly 
cannot hold a session. „Otherwise the Constitution does not define or delimit 
the, kinds of acts issued by the State Council. A very differentiated system of 
the State Council's acts is described in Rumanian writings on constitutional 
law partly on the ground of constitutional provisions, partly of the „practice 
evolved". First of all distinction is made between the a) legal and b) political 
acts of the State Council. (By the latter political declarations, important com-
munications on international relations are meant.) Among legal acts the fol-
lowing distinction is made: a) decrees, b) resolutions. Both decrees and reso-
lutions may be normative or individual. Law-Decrees come within the domain 
of normative decrees.37 As regards contents three groups of normative decrees 
are distinguished: a) decrees amending Acts. In the majori ty of cases Acts a re 
amended by decrees. Also codes are amended by decrees, b) Decrees regulating 
legal institutions. The State Council acts also in such instances in its substi-
tutive powers, irrespective of whether the subject coming under regulation is 
or is not qualified under the Constitution or other statute explicitly as a 
legislative subject. This also indicates that both types of the decrees now 
mentioned should be submitted for approval to the Great National Assembly 
while the next category of decrees (i.e. issued by the State Council within its 
proper powers) this obligation does not apply. Approval is effected by one-
Section Acts — with short motivation added. The motivation is usually 
published, c) As follows, decrees on subjects coming within the State Council's 
proper powers constitute the third group of decrees. Under Section 63 of the 
Constitution the powers of the State Council comprise several limited and 
special fields as regards legislation, like e.g. the establishment of military 
ranks, honorary titles, ranks, the regulation of diplomatic service, etc. The fac t 
that the obligation to submit for approval only normative decrees regulating 
these subjects provides also a. a contrario argument that the primary, basic 
legal regulation of social relationships if regarded a legislative subject, i.e. 
coming within the powers of the Great National Assembly, also in the Socialist 
Republic of Rumania. 
As regards the figures when decrees and Acts are compared — in the last 
three years (after the Constitutional Amendment in 1969) the following should 
be observed: in 1970 9 Acts, 44 Law-Decrees, in 1971 26 Acts, 77 Law-Decrees, 
in 1972 15 Acts, 77 Law-Decrees were adopted. (It should be noted that only 
enactments considered as statutes proper are included in these statistics. 
Accordingly Acts approving Law-Decrees consisting of one Section as well as 
Law-Decrees rat ifying international treaties have not been included.) The area 
regulated directly by Acts is relatively wide. Not only constitutional amend-
ments, subjects connected with the national economic plan and budget bu t 
also basic statutes, codes and other not major but subjects of general interests 
37 cf.: Draganu, T.: Drept Constitutional, Bucharest, 1972. p. 393 et seq. 
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were regulated directly in Acts. Such subjects regulated by Acts were e.g.: the 
control of the quality of commodities; work organization and work discipline 
in enterprises; the protection of certain categories of minors; the control of 
enterprise materials and finances; organization of work and production in 
agriculture; pastures and related questions; employers' messes; local council, 
agricultural cooperative and other cooperative — industrial organization; pro-
duction and rational utilization of fodder; pensioners' mutual aid associations; 
organization of the social-economic Workers' Control Council etc. 
All this shows that legislative subjects exceed also in the socialist Re-
public of Rumania the subjects as laid down in the Constitution. 
Under Section 43 of the Constitution (which provides for the powers of 
the Great National Assembly) legislative subjects are: adoption and amend-
ment of the Constitution; regulation of the electoral system; laying down of 
the national economic plan; the budget; the regulation of the organization 
and activity of the principal State organs; the council of ministers, the mi-
nistries and other central organs of public administration, the judiciary, the 
procuracy, local organs of State power, area divisions, amnesty, the promul-
gation and ratification of international treaties which require amendments of 
Acts. Under other provisions of the Constitution legislative powers comprise 
the loss and acquisition of nationality, labour protection, protection of youth 
and women, of personal property, of the right to succession, the regulation of 
religious organizations, the privacy of homes, the right to compensation for 
unlawful acts. 
It is interesting that the relevant Rumanian literature, while pointing out 
the unlimited legislative powers of the Great National Assembly, does not 
regard as legally significant if certain subjects are distinguished in the 
Constitution as legislative subjects. Some writers hold that this fact shows 
merely the political, social, economic significance of the subjects concerned 
and can have no bearing on the law-making powers of the State Council. 
This is at variance with the Soviet views already mentioned, according to 
which under such regulation the Presidium's law-making powers are thought 
to be limited. But it is also a fact that the Soviet Constitution is not as clear-
cut in regard to the Presidium's substitutive powers as Section 64 of the 
Rumanian Constitution. 
It should be pointed out lastly that the close contacts between the State 
Council and the Committees of the Great National Assembly are emphasized 
in the relevant legal writings in Rumania in respect of the State Council's 
powers of enacting Law-Decrees. In making Law-Decrees the Committee con-
cerned is always consulted, its chairman attends the meeting of the State 
Council, the committee submits a declaration to the Great National Assembly 
when the Law-Decree is discussed and approved, pointing out also the reasons 
of urgency. 
d) The State Council of the Bulgarian People's Republic which works 
according to the 1971 Constitution is an institution essentially similar to the 
Rumanian State Council. It consists of a President, deputy-presidents, secretary 
and members. The number of members is not fixed in the Constitution which 
provides opportunity for electing into the State Council a relatively large 
number of the representatives of State and social organs or heads of these 
who, by actively participating assist the State Council in discharging its 
principal function as laid down in the Constitution, in combining „legislative 
153 
and executive power". It is laid down in the Constitution tha t the State 
Council is a State power organ. Literature a f te r the adoption of the Consti-
tution emphasizes the fact that the State Council's work goes beyond State 
power functions; it discharges a particular government activity which is closer 
to public administration.38 Accordingly, it is such a particular State power 
organ which „belongs also to the system of public administrative organs". The 
State Council's powers comprise the interpretation of Acts. The principal 
forms of its legislative activity are: a) adoption of ukases and legal Acts on 
basic questions following f rom Acts and the resolutions of the National 
Assembly. Such ukases are issued within the State Council's proper powers 
without the obligation of subsequent approval, by virtue of Article 93 of the 
Constitution; b) between the sessions of the National Assembly — in urgent 
cases — it amends and supplements Acts by ukases; it issues ukases on mat-
ters of principle affecting the State's executive and disposing activity. (This 
second subject is presumably a residue or effect of the conception according 
to which subjects relating to State organization are not considered as legislative 
subjects.) Issuing of this category of ukases is based on Article 94 of the 
Constitution; c) under Article 95 of the Constitution under conditions of war. 
if convening the National Assembly is not possible the State Council has 
powers to issue ukases which repeal or amend Acts or regulate subjects not 
regulated by the legislation. Ukases issued on the two latter subjects (b) and 
(c) shall be submitted for approval at the next session of the National 
Assembly. 
Start ing f rom these constitutional provisions and the practice evolved, 
Bulgarian legal writings point out such limitations of the State Council which 
illustrate also the relationship between Acts and Law-Decrees. These limita-
tions prevail only in the normal legislative process. Under conditions of war 
the State Council exercises powers identical with those of the National 
Assembly — constitutional amendments excepted. These limitations may be so 
summed up : a) the State Council has powers to amend only parts of Acts in 
force. This applies also to the supplements. All this means that amendments 
and supplements adopted by the State Council shall not affect the basic 
institutions of Acts adopted by the National Assembly; b) some institutions of 
the public administrative organization, Law-Decrees excepted, shall not contain 
a regulation of entire legal institutions even between the sessions of the 
National Assembly." Thus, e.g. codes shall not be enacted in Law-Decrees; c) 
Law-Decrees shall not contain pr imary law, at least in the sense that they 
shall not regulate social relationships not regulated in Acts up to that time. 
(This limitation is inferred a contrario f rom the provisions of Section 95 
already mentioned.) It should be pointed out also in this context that the 
laying down in the Constitution of legislative subjects is not regarded as if it 
restricted the State Council's substitutive powers. 
Relatively small experience is available in respect of the working of the 
new Constitution. As regards practice prior to the Constitution it may be 
interesting to point out that while the former, 1947 Constitution had been in 
force, it occurred, although in exceptional cases, tha t the government obtained 
authori ty to issue Act-amending statutes. Thus e.g. Law-Decree No. 1931 of 
38 cf.: Vlkanov, V.: Dorzsavniat Soviet v Konstitutiite Na NRB, GDR PNR, i 
SRR) (The State Council in the Constitutions of Bulgaria, Poland, the German 
Democratic Republic arid Rumania). Soc. Pravo, 1972. No. 5. pp. 3—9. 
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.November 20, 1970. „confers authori ty on the Council of Ministers to conf i rm 
normative acts until new statutes are issued on the implementation of the 
economic mechanism relating to the period 1971—1975, which may depar t f rom 
the statutory provisions in force". It is also remarkable tha t the execution of 
this Law-Decree was entrusted not to the Council of Ministers bu t to its 
chairman. „The execution of this Law-Decree shall be the duty of the chair-
man of the Council of Ministers". (Official Gazette, Dr. Veszt., December 1, 
1970. No. 95). It is very difficult to illustrate by mere f igures the relation 
between Acts and Law-Decrees in the highest-level legislation. Both Acts and 
Law-Decrees abound which are on its merits, no law-making acts. The number 
of Acts is e.g. considerably increased by the approval of Law-Decrees. Taking 
this into account the f igures on the highest-level legislation in the past f ive 
years are included among the notes.39 
39 1968: 8 Acts (of these four Codes, the Family Law Code, Criminal Law Code, 
Nationality Code; Acts on patents and innovations, approval of earlier Law-Decrees) 
16 normative ukases. 
1969: 23 Acts (of these the major pieces of legislation) the 1969 Plan Act, 
Budget Act; on the names of ministries; on the protection of artistic monuments; 
Act on water resources; amendment of the Act on property insurance; amendment 
of the Act on the transfer of property rights; amendment of the customs Act; Act 
on the enforcement of penalties; lease Act; Act on the State Insurance Institute; 
amendment of the Act on People's Councils; Act on the amendment of the Cons-
titution; the 1971 Plan Act; the 1970 traffic misdemeanour Code; passport Act; road 
Act and foreign trade Act. 19 normative ukases: of these the most important: the 
names of ministries, amendment of the Act on building repair, establishment of the 
order of merit; amendment of the Law-Decree on labour obligation; amendment of 
the distinction Act; establishment of new order of merit; development of military 
schools; housing; housing by the Ministry of Interior; establishment of the 25 year 
People's Power Jubilee Order of Merit; development of the military schools; estab-
lishment of the Jubilee Order of Merit; declaring parishes towns; amendment of 
the pension Act; amendment of the Law-Decree on the People's Police. 
1970: 8 Acts: among these Act on public administrative procedure; maritime 
shipping Code; on the State Insurance Institute and the amendment of the Act on 
Property insurance; the 1971 Plan Act; the 1971 Budget Act; the others approve 
Law-Decrees (jointly or one by one). (Among these the approval of an authorization 
of the government to issue, in connection with the economic reform, statutes at 
variance with Acts in force.) 19 normative Law-Decrees: the cadretraining Academy 
is declared a college of higher education; amendment of the Law-Decree on the 
People's Police; amendment of the Act on standards; amendment of some pro-
visions of the Law-Decree on the amendment of the pension Act; declaring some 
parishes towns; establishment of committees of quality, of standards and of me-
teorology attached to the Council of Ministers; on the compulsory treatment of drug 
addicts; approval of the disciplinary regulations of railway personnel: amendment 
of the Act on compulsory military service; amendment of the Law-Decree on the 
Bar; amendment of the Labour Code, etc. It is a general feature in 1970 that many 
Act amendments are contained in ukases, in other words, Acts are amended mainly 
by means of Law-Decrees. It happens infrequently that partial amendments are 
submitted to Parliament. 
1971: 11 Acts including the Constitution, but only a minor part of these is of 
material significance; the Constitution itself, the five-year plan Act, the 1971 Plan 
Act; the 1972 Plan Act and the 1972 Budget Act. 17 normative Law-Decrees: amend-
ment and supplementation of the pension Act; establishment of a secondary school; 
changes in the country's administrative area; amendment of the Election Act; re-
gulation of the television and radio, opening of the military secondary school; 
reorganization of a college faculty; establishment of a teachers' training college; 
supplement to the Law-Decree on military schools; establishment of university; 
financial liability of military personnel; establishment of agricultural academy; 
approval of the plastic effigy of the arms of the nation; Dimitrov-Prize. 
153 
e) The State Council of the. German Democratic Republic discharges essen-
tially, like its Bulgarian, and Rumanian counterparts, the functions of a „little 
Parliament", a t least in the sense tha t it strives to discharge the function of a 
Parl iament as a political forum. This is borne out by its composition and 
structure. Under the 1968 Constitution the State Council consists of a president, 
a deputy-president, a secretary and members: the number either of . its 
members or its officers is not fixed. The relating commentaries point out that 
special attention is paid tha t its membership should include representatives 
of Parliament, political parties, social organizations and important State 
organs. Accordingly, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, leading repre-
sentatives of the parties in the Democratic block and t he . president of the 
People's Chamber — the supreme representative organ — are all deputy 
chairmen of the State Council. The. chairman has special duties: he shall 
„direct the work of the State Council". The State Council has close contacts 
with the People's Chamber and its committees; the State Council is, so to 
speak, the direct organizer of the plenary sessions of the People's Chamber.40 
Acts issued by the State Council are: Erlass (this is usually translated as Law-
Decree) and Beschluss (Resolution). The State Council has powers under the 
Constitution to interpret Acts unless this is not exercised by the People's 
Chamber. 
I t regulates by Law-Decrees „all the questions which follow f rom the 
Acts and Resolutions of the People's Chamber, the highest representative body-. 
These shall be submitted for approval to the People's Chamber". It would 
follow f rom this provision tha t the State Council cannot adopt Law-Decrees 
but by virtue of Acts or resolutions of the People's Chamber. The fact is, 
however, that the „Erlass" appears as a distinct highest-degree legislative 
act — Acts excepted. It could also be^ inferred f rom the obligation to submit 
such, enactments for approval that the „Erlass" may contain also Act-amending 
provisions. It should be pointed out that Law-Decrees issued af te r 1968 do 
not contain Act-amending provisions. This might allow the conclusion that the 
Constitution-maker had no intention to confer such powers on the State 
Council. It should also be stated tha t the number of Law-Decrees is very 
small: one or two Law-Decrees are issued annually (if Law-Decrees promul-
gating international treaties are not counted). Otherwise the number of 
Acts is also small. 
f) In the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, where there is a one-person 
. head of State and where there are special types of Acts, the so-called constitu-
t ional Acts, the number of Law-Decrees is likewise low. Figures, for recent 
1972: 11 Acts of which the most important are: on the recall of Parliamentary 
deputies and council members; copyright Act; Act on motor vehicles; amendment 
of the income tax Act; on scientific degrees; on tourism; on civil aviation; on the 
national economic plan; on the budget. 19 normative Law-Decrees: establishment of 
the Press Commission attached to the Council of Ministers; establishment of a 
University in Plovdiv; reorganization of the branch of the Academy of Music; on 
State health control; establishment of a medical academy; establishment of an 
•order of merit; pension Act; Higher Education Act; Act on compulsory military 
•service; amendment of custom Acts; on the establishment of a housing fund; on the 
work and rights of medical personnel; on the police; on the fire brigade; amend-
ment of the Law-Decree amending the pension Act. 
40 cf.: Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik. Dokumente Kom-
mentar, II. Staatsverlag der DDR. Berlin, 1969. p. 303 et seq. 
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years are : 1965: 24 Acts, 5 Law-Decrees; 1966: 11 Acts, 5 Law-Decrees; 1967: 
14 Acts, 9 Law-Decrees; 1968: 44 Acts, 4 Law-Decrees; 1969: 22 Acts, 1 Law-
Decree; 1970: 26 Acts, 3 Law-Decrees; 1971: 16 Acts, 1 Law-Decree. The pos-
sibility of issuing Law-Decrees is at present provided for in Article 58 of the 
constitutional Act on the federation. Under its te rms measures which cannot 
be delayed and which would require regulation by Acts, the Presidium of the 
Federal Assembly enacts as Law-Decrees; these shall be signed, by the 
President of the Republic, the President of the Federal Assembly, and the 
Pr ime Minister of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. Law-Decrees are 
promulgated in a manner identical with the promulgation of Acts.41 
The number of Law-Decrees in Czechoslovakia is relatively low. This is 
accounted for, to an extent, by the existence in the Czechoslovak Socialist « 
Republic of the special type of constitutional Acts beside the Constitution 
which limit, to a certain degree, the emergence of the fo rm of Law-Decrees 
usually introduced in other socialist countries. 
Legislative acts similar to our Law-Decrees had in any case a very 
restricted role also in the earlier development of Czechoslovak law. The 
position following upon the adoption of the f i rs t socialist, 1948 Constitution is 
worthwhile to note. Under this Constitution the possibility of enacting Law-
Decrees was open. The form of government in the Czechoslovak Socialist 
Republic was built also under the 1948 Constitution on the insti tution of a 
one-person head of State. However, in addition to the President of the 
Republic, the permanently working organ of the National Assembly, its P re -
sidium had considerable powers also in the legislative field. Members and the 
Presidium were elected each year. The Presidium had powers to issue bin-
ding interpretations of Acts. Basides, between the National Assembly's ses-
sions (and in periods when the National Assembly was dissolved, its m a n -
date came to an end or could not be convened because of war or other con-
ditions of emergency) it could act as a substitute for the National Assembly 
— matters coming within the exclusive competence of the National Assembly 
excepted. It had no powers to amend the Constitution, constitutional Acts, it 
could not elect the President of the Republic or the Vice-President. In addi-
tion, it had no powers — between sessions of the National Assembly — to 
lengthen the duration of compulsory military service, to issue declaration of 
war, to raise taxes, or government expenditure for a prolonged period (cf. 
Section 66, 1968 Constitution). A separate provision is found in the Consti-
tution on the Law-Decrees to be issued by the Presidium. Under this provision 
the Presidium was authorized to issue Law-Decrees only upon a government 
proposal. Law-Decrees had to be signed by the President of the Republic, the 
President of the National Assembly and half of the members of government. 
41 Since the adoption of the Act on federation the following Law-Decrees were 
promulgated. (Only on federal level.) In 1969 federal. Law-Decree 99/1969. Sb. on 
certain temporary measures necessary to strengthen and protect public order. In 1970 
15/1970. Sb. 1. Federal Law-Decree on the termination of the right of use of flats 
and evacuation of flats of nationals who are staying unlawfully outside the Cze-
choslovak Socialist Republic; 2. Federal Law-Decree 16/1970. Sb. on the establish-
ment of an order of merit for strengthening comradeship-in-arms; 3. Federal Law-
Decree 26/1970. Sb. on the amendment and supplement of 54/1963. Sb. Act on the 
Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences. In 1971: Federal Law-Decree 145/1971. Sb. on 
the amendment of the command structure of the Frontier Guard. There was no 
Law-Decree adopted in 1972. 
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In the event signature was refused by the President of the Republic or t h e 
Prime Minister, the Law-Decree could not be issued (Section 66/6). 
In fact such Law-Decrees were not issued until 1954. This was m a d e 
possible by the fact that the government was authorized, although within, 
much narrower limits, to issue decrees at variance wi th Acts in force. A few-
months a f te r the 1948 Constitution had been adopted, the government was-
authorized under Act No. 24 of 1948, Sb. z. on the five-year national economic 
plan to take measures, by means of decrees up to December 31, 1953, neces-
sary for the implementation of the five-year plan which otherwise would 
require the adoption of an Act. Such decree must be approved by t h e 
President of the Republic, who also shall sign it. Acts relating to „constitutional 
relations" could not be amended under this authorization either. This au tho r -
ization did not comprise approval of the budget, of credit deals, the settlement 
of State debt, the regulation of taxes, customs, public services, financial 
monopoly, and matters connected with foreign currency. The government was-
bound to submit its decrees issued by virtue of this authorization to the-
National Assembly within one month af ter their promulgation. Approval had. 
to be given by the absolute majori ty of all deputies. 
This authorization was prolonged, apart f rom a short period, while some-
minor changes were made in the subjects coming under the authorization, l i k e 
e.g. Act No. 2 of 1954, Act No. 13 of 1955. The authorization is repeated, with 
major changes, in Act No. 63 of 1958 on the second five-year plan. Acts on. 
the third and four th five-year plans do not contain such an authorization. 
(Act No. 165 of 1960, Act No. 83 of 1966). 
While the government had authorization under the enactments now-
mentioned to issue decrees at variance with Acts in force in respect to the-
system of economic management, another authorization extended this pos-
sibility to very important domains of political conditions. Constitutional Act 
No. 47 of 1950 Sb.z. on „the reformation of public administrative organiza-
tion" authorized the government to issue decrees at variance with Acts in. 
force on every subject coming within this field. (These decrees had likewise-
to be signed by the President of the Republic.) This authorization was parti-
cularly widely interpreted in practice. Reorganization of ministries, establish-
ment of new ministries and, connected with this, rules on competences and 
organization formerly coming within the scope of regulation by Acts were-
provided for in government decrees. 
After the 1960 Constitution had been adopted writings on constitutional 
law reverted several times to the nature of these authorizations. Usually not 
the fact of these authorizations was subjected to criticism but the practice-
evolved in their wake, as a consequence of which the role and legislative-
activity of the National Assembly was considerably reduced and the highest-
level legislative work „was conferred to a significant extent f rom the National' 
Assembly to the government and the President of the Republic".42 (Ustavni. 
Pravo, Praha, 1965. Orbis, p. 103.). 
g) In Yugoslavia the institution of Law-Decrees underwent varied changes-
both as regards its fo rm and the organs authorized to issue such enactments. 
Under the 1946 Constitution the system of the supreme State organs of the-
Yugoslav Federal Republic was essentially modelled upon the central organs 
of the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the Presidium had more or less similar 
42 Ustavni Pravo, Prague, 1965. Orbis, p. 103. 
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-powers. „It shall issue binding explanation of federal Acts". ..it shall promul-
gate Acts adopted, it shall issue ukases" — is provided in Section 74 (5) and 
(6) of the 1946 Constitution. However, the Constitution reserved the possibility 
•~to authorize the government to issue Act-supplementing and Act-amending 
•decrees. (Section 78 of the 1946 Constitution.) It was in the latter direction 
that practice has shaped the mechanism of flexible law-making. Between 1946 
and 1950 345 Law-Decrees were issued by the government while 106 Acts and 
42 Act-amendments were adopted by the National Assembly. Constitutional 
.Acts adopted in 1953 introduced considerable changes in this system. The 
institution of a one-person head of State was established; the Fereral Executive 
•Council was constituted as the direct executive-disposing organ of the federal 
-Skupstina. The Federal Executive Council was regarded f r o m the outset not 
simply as the „supreme public administrative organ" (as it was termed in the 
1949 Hungarian Constitution and other socialist constitutions), but as the 
; supreme organ of „political implementation". Usually a distinction was made 
between the organs of „political implementation" which were mainly elected 
-executive-disposing organs on the one hand, and public administrat ive or 
administrative organs composed of professionals.43 If the mat ter is somewhat 
rsimplified it might be said that the Federal Executive Council was regarded, 
: so to speak, as an intermediary between Presidium-type supreme power organs 
and the councils of ministers considered as the supreme public administrat ive 
• organs. 
The Federal Executive Council was granted relatively wide law-making 
powers. These included: in addition to issuing decrees for the implementation 
•of Acts, it had powers to issue decrees on subjects not regulated in Acts but 
in need of regulation. (This type of decrees was termed earlier in this work, 
-applying the historically evolved categories of Hungarian legislation, as Act-
substitutive decree.) These regulated very important questions connected with 
the implementation of the social plan and the federal budget and mainly the 
• organization of public administration. [These powers correspond, more or less, 
to those accorded under the 1949 Hungarian Constitution to the Council of 
Ministers if the provision that „the government has powers to place any 
public administrative branch under its direct control and to establish separate 
organs for that purpose" (Section 40/3) is widely interpreted. This provision 
ns interpreted now as conferring powers to reorganize the internal relationships 
of the government apparatus but when it is widely interpreted a certain 
independent law-making powers of the government may be based on it.] In 
addition, the Federal Executive Council was authorized, in order to harmonize 
the legal system with the constitutional amendment of 1953, to issue Law-
Decrees. This authorization was for one year. Af ter tha t it was authorized to 
issue Law-Decrees in the economic field on subjects which had been regulated 
-earlier by means of Law-Decrees. This system was fu r the r changed under the 
1963 Constitution. In implementing this Constitution the principle tha t original 
law (the pr imary regulation of social relationships) must be made only in 
.Acts was most strictly interpreted. The institution of Law-Decrees was 
abolished respectively restricted to the time of war or danger of wa r i.e. a 
.-state of emergency. 
43 Popovic, S. : Upravno pravo — oposti deo. (Public administrative law. General 
part.) Belgrade, 1966. p. 188 et seq. 
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- A strong emphasis is laid in the 1963 Constitution on the legislative 
powers of the Federal Skupstina, i.e. the supreme representative body; if the 
Constitution is strictly interpreted the Federal Executive Council could not 
make law unless explicitly authorized under Acts. According to Section 228 
of the Federal Constitution the Federal Executive Council issues decrees, 
resolutions and instructions to implement federal Acts and other general 
-enactments of the Federal Skupstina — provided it has been authorized to do 
so by an Act or such enactments (clause 4). 
: Practice has continuously widened the. interpretation of this provision 
arriving at a solution that no concrete Act is required for authorization but 
the law-making powers of the Federal Executive Council are essentially so 
conceived tha t it has powers to issue statutes to implement the policy laid 
•down by the supreme representative body. This legal possibility is particularly 
clearly set for th in Acts governing the Federal Executive Council's organization 
and activity. Already Act No. 384 (Sluzbeni List, April 21, 1965) provides that 
the Federal Executive Council shall be in charge of: the execution of federal 
Acts, the implementation of the social plan, the implementation of the federal 
budget and other enactments of the Federal Skupstina and the enforcement of 
the policy determined by the Skupstina; for this purpose it shall make pro-
posals, adopt statutes and take action for which it is authorized. (Section 2). 
A new Act adopted in 1971 on the same subject (Sluzbeni List, Ju ly 28, 
1971) fu r the r widens law-making possibilities by using even more general 
t e rms particularly in respect to the enactments on the Federal Executive 
Council's authorization. It is also clear tha t the new terms do not go to the 
length either to authorize the Federal Executive Council to issue Act-amending 
decrees or to provide possibility for such authorization by Acts; it should be 
mentioned as a point of interest that the term used in the 1971 Act is very 
similar to the now-mentioned Section 78 of the 1946 Constitution. As pointed 
it was this Section on which Act-substitutive and Act-amending decrees of 
the government, i.e. Law-Decrees, issued under authorization had been based; 
bu t it should also be pointed out that legislative practice has shown in the 
past years that the Federal Executive Council's normative acts are always 
based on authorization in Acts. In other words, beside the relatively active 
and extensive legislative activity there is no problem to have the government 
take action as an executive organization and have its law-making activity 
performed by virtue of concrete Acts.44 
44 Section 78 of the 1946 Constitution runs as follows: „The government of the 
Yugoslav Federal People's Republic shall work on the ground of the Constitution 
and Federal Statutes. The government of the Yugoslav People's Republic shall adopt 
decrees on the application of Acts and decrees by virtue of lawful authorization as 
well as binding decrees and orders on the execution of Federal Acts and shall 
supervise their implementation." Constitution of the Yugoslav Federal People's 
Republic. Published by Magyar Szo, Novisad, 1947. (the earlier translation was 
deliberately left unchanged). The authorization 'of the government to issue Law-
Decrees was based in the practice evolved after the adoption of the Constitution 
(and the interpretation expounded several times in legal writings) on the distinction 
made in this Section between decrees issued on the ground of authorization in Act 
and the implementation of Acts. Such or a similar duality is discernible also in the 
new Act on the Federal Executive Council. The first part of the Act runs as follows: 
„The Federal Executive Council shall attend to the implementation of the policy of 
the Federal Parliament, shall propose to the Federal. Parliament, the laying down of 
policy; shall direct and coordinate the activities of Federal public administrative 
153 
The new Constitution of 1974 and the connected legal regulation a r e 
based on this development. According to the Section 347 (5) of the n e w 
Constitution the Federal Executive Council issues decrees and resolution f o r 
the enforcement of the federal Acts, other legal rules and acts of a general 
na ture of the SFRY. From this provision of law it may appear tha t the 
Federal Executive Council has no power of original legislation. But the 
provision of the Act enacted for the enforcement of the Constitution is not u n -
ambiguous so much (Act No. 308 on the Federal Executive Council, Official 
Gazette, 1974, No. 21.) because Section 6 (1) provides: the Federal Execut ive 
Council ensures the carrying out of the points of view of the Pres idium of 
the SFRY, concerning the implementation of the policy the enforcement of t h e 
Acts and other acts of a general nature of the Assembly of the Deputies, 
fur ther , the taking of the necessary measures for the implementation of t he 
policy, Acts and other acts of a general nature. This Section could be conceived 
in such a manner also that it does not exclude the so called original legislation 
aiming at the implementation of the policy formulated in a general way. 
Even more so, because the concept of „policy" appearing in the text of t he 
Act is not circumscribed, thus it can be conceived in the widest sense of t h e 
word. It is worth mentioning tha t the terminology of „policy" appears in th is 
wide sense of the word even in the Constitution, among others in the Sections 
concerning the competence of the Presidium of the SFRY. Accordingly, t h e 
Presidium of the SFRY has a power to take a stand on the implementat ion 
of the policy, the enforcement of the Acts and the acts of a general na tu re of 
the Assembly of the Deputies of the SFRY and it may ask the Federal 
Executive Council to take the necessary measures for the implementation of 
the policy and the enforcement of the Acts and other acts of a general na tu re 
adopted by the Assembly of the Deputies. It seems to be tha t policy appears 
in this Section in a too general sense, it may mean the aims set by the 
Skupstina (Assembly of the Deputies), but even directly the policy and re -
solutions of the Par ty as well. 
III. THE RISE AND PROBLEMS OF EVOLUTION OF 
LAW-DECREES IN HUNGARY 
1. When the perspective of the Law-Decree in Hungary is examined t he 
solutions adopted in the fr iendly socialist countries as well as Hungar ian 
tradition and experience should be taken into consideration. 
If the Hungarian institution is compared to its counterparts in f r iendly 
socialist countries we are faced with a difficult problem. As has been pointed 
out in this work, each socialist country had adopted particular solutions in 
this very important domain of the highest-level legislation. This is otherwise 
clearly borne out by the detailed survey found in preceding chapters. While 
aware of the risks of a certain simplification it might perhaps be said tha t 
organs and Federal organizations; shall adopt acts and shall take action to which 
it is authorized; it shall attend to other political-executive matters and shall bear 
responsibility for the implementation of policy, the exécution of Federal Acts and 
other general acts of the Federal Parliament." (The Official Gazette of the Yugoslav 
Socialist Federal Republic, July 28, 1971. Year XXVII. No. 32. Act on the Federal 
Executive Council, I. General Provisions. Section 1.). 
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the variants outlined can be classified into two principal types. One principal 
type is the solution where this institution does not exist or has but minor 
iunctions — at least in practice. This type comprises the variants evolved in 
Yugoslavia, the German Democratic Republic, Poland an — essentially — in 
the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The other principal type, i.e. the solution 
where the Law-Decree has a relatively important part to play in the highest-
level legislation is found in the Soviet Union and Bulgaria. The Hungarian 
variant of Law-Decree should be included within the latter category. The 
Decrees in the Socialist Republic of Rumania should be ranged with this 
.group — their numerous special characteristics notwithstanding. 
This classification indicates also that experience which might be useful in 
Hungary should be looked for among the solutions included within the second 
principal category. Several elements are found in the evolution of this institu-
tion — in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and, in part, in Rumania which may be 
taken into account in moulding the relationship between the Act and the 
Law-Decree in Hungary. 
When Hungarian traditions and experience are reviewed it should first 
of all be taken into consideration that prior to the adoption of the 1949 
•Constitution the Hungarian Constitution had not known the classical form of 
Law-Decrees, i.e. Law-Decrees issued by the Head of State. Before World 
War I this institution could not strike root because of the Hapsburg rule and 
the uninterrupted legislative activity of Parliament — as pointed out when 
the related issues have been discussed in connection with Hungarian legislative 
traditions. As regards government Decrees issued on authorization and at 
variance with Acts, this institution was functioning only in a state of 
emergency. This must be stated even if we are aware that in the inter-war 
period, during the counter-revolutionary terror, when the regime was heading 
towards fascism, and in time of war the government had practically uninter-
rupted powers to issue Act-amending decrees. 
In the first post-war years first reconstruction then the political and 
economic tasks to be performed in the first period of transition towards 
socialism demanded an authorization of the government which comprised also 
powers to issue decrees at variance with Acts in force. (The system of author-
ization has already been outlined. There the limitations by means of legislative 
subjects of law-making authorization have been described.) In this epoch it 
was the government which was the principal organ of the highest-level 
legislation. 
This duty was discharged by the government under varying conditions. 
There were periods e.g. when parallel with the government's law-making 
activity the legislative work of Parliament was very extensive. (It will perhaps 
be not unnecessary if some figures are given: in 1945 11, in 1946 29, in 1947 
35, in 1948 63, in 1949 up to the adoption of the Constitution 19, after its 
adoption 10 Acts were adopted by Parliament. The total number of Acts from 
the Liberation of the country up to the adoption of the Constitution is 157). 
The government's role in law-making was strengthened by the fact that 
between 1945 and 1949 (up to the May, 1949 elections) the government was 
not only more homogeneous in comparison with Parliament but secured more 
direct and more favourable opportunities for political forces fighting for 
socialism. 
The dominant position of the government in the highest-level legislation 
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was not impaired by the incidental (or periodical) participation of ex t r a -
parl iamentary and extra-government organs in the exercise of supreme power . 
Students of the problem are aware that the Supreme National Council, which 
discharged temporarily the powers of the head of State had practically no 
law-making authority. (One single subject came within its powers which w a s 
connected with law-making: introduction of decorations and distinctions, of . : 
Act No. I l l of 1945, Section 2). The Political Committee of the Provisional 
National Assembly had also only an incidental role in the highest-level legisla-
tion. At the outset it had no legislative funct ions at all; later it issued, joint ly 
with the provisional national government, a s tatute on the organization and 
working of the Supreme National Council. Also later it took action which 
could be regarded as normative. The Political Committee of the Provisional 
National Assembly is f requent ly mentioned in legal l i terature as the germ, a 
rudimentary form of the Presidium. No doubt, this claim has certain f o u n d a -
tions since the Political Committee had powers to act for the Provisional 
Nationál Assembly when the mat ter permitted of no delay, particularly in 
regard to the constitution of principal state organs. In addition, it had powers 
to exercise control over the work of the government and the entire government 
apparatus. But its legislative activity remained within very narrow limits. F o r 
this reason drawing a parallel between the Presidium and the Political 
Committee of the Provisional National Assembly appears to be somewhat 
exaggerated — at least as f a r as legislation is concerned.45 
Under Act No. I of 1946 the President of the Republic was formal ly t h e 
head of the Executive. „The President of the Republic shall exercise executive 
power through the government accountable to the National Assembly". „Every 
action and measure of the President of the Republic has to be countersigned 
by the Pr ime Minister or the responsible minister concerned" — is laid down 
in Section 13 of the Republic Act. Theoretically, these provisions, did not 
preclude the emergence of the legislative powers of the President of t he 
Republic — based on the government's accountability. These powers, however , 
did not materialize. Although some normative acts were issued by t h e 
President of the Republic at a later period in the fo rm of presidental resolu-
tions — these are not significant compared to the government 's law-making 
activity. 
It may therefore be concluded on the ground of what has been expounded 
that the post-1945 developments do not display elements which could be 
conceived as the precursor of the Law-Decree. The 1949 socialist Constitution, 
when introducing the institution of Law-Decree made use f irst of all of t h e 
constitutional evolution cin friendly socialist countries. By so doing, the Cons-
titution provided an opportunity to shape, on the legislative level, wi thin t h e 
system of the supreme representative organs, a highest-level legislative organ 
which secured a flexible f ramework during the transition towards socialism, 
for amending, supplementing Acts and, when necessary, for the relatively 
quick, Act-level regulation of new social relationships in every case when 
such an action was demanded by the revolutionary, rapid changes in social 
relationships. 
45 The Provisional National Assembly Political Committee's functions and their 
evolution is analysed by Beér, J.: Az Ideiglenes Nemzetgyűlés, (1944—1945) (The 
Provisional National Assembly, 1944—1945). Jogtudományi Közlöny, 1960. No. 54 
p. 253 et seq. 
Simultaneous with institutionalizing the wide legislative powers of ther 
Presidium, the Constitution meant a major step toward democratizing legislative 
mechanism by barring the possibility of authorizing the government to issue 
decrees at variance with Acts in force. Such an authorization is precluded by 
the Constitutional provision according to which the decrees of the Council of" 
Ministers „shall not be contrary to the Acts of the People's Republic or the 
decrees adopted by the Presidium of the People's Republic". (Section 25 (2) of 
the 1949 Constitution.) It should be noted that the constitutions of socialist, 
countries which were adduced as examples of the functioning of government 
authorization after the adoption of socialist constitutions, do not contain such, 
a provision. It is- also true that they do not provide for ,such an extensive 
substitutive powers of the Presidium or similar organs to the extent as it is-
done in the 1949 Hungarian Constitution. 
The 1972 constitutional amendment contains a new wording of the above-
mentioned provision. According to the new wording: „the decree and re-
solution of the Council of Ministers shall not be contrary to Acts and Law-
Decrees". [Section 35 (2)]. As far as the preclusion of authorization is con-
cerned also this wording is unequivocal. Still, reference to the earlier wording 
is not unnecessary in this context because it better reflected the transition, 
from the pre-constitution legislative mechanims to the post-constitution, 
mechanism. 
The adoption of the socialist constitution, the introduction of new-type-
State and legal institutions obviously meant a turning point (or at least a 
borderline) in the legislative pattern. Under the new conditions, by strictly 
interpreting the 1949 wording of the Constitution, a distinction was made-
between post-constitution and pre-constitution Acts — and within this latter 
category between pre-1945 and post-1945 Acts. This distinction, when applied 
to the government's legislative powers involved consequences to the effect that-
government decrees amended without authorization pre-liberation Acts ; but 
the government issued decrees at variance with Acts adopted between 1945-
and 1949 only by way of exception and on the ground of special authorization. 
The latter category comprises e.g. decrees issued by virtue of authorization 
contained in Law-Decrees No. 10 of 1949 on the regulation of co-operative-
relationships (under Section 2 of this Law-Decree the government was author-
ized „to regulate by decree cooperative legal relationships — if necessary, in a_ 
manner different from the provisions of Act No. XI of 1947 and of the-
supplementing and amending statutes"). 
As it is seen, a fitting interpretation of the Constitution provides pos -
sibility for justifying in the instances mentioned, and this possibility still 
exists, the government's incidental authorization to amend the Acts of the-
„Republic" but such an authorization is precluded, as a matter of principle on 
the ground of explicit constitutional provisions, in regard to amending the-
Acts of the People's Republic and the Law-Decrees of the Presidium. In this 
respect the possibility and practicability of the so-called temporary or ex-
perimental authorization may be strongly argued, for the simple reason that, 
the constitution-based legislative mechanism had not taken into account such, 
authorization and therefore it did not set up a system of control for such, 
contingencies. 
2. All this does not amount to stating that — by now — all the problems-
in regard to the mutual relationships of legislative activity of the legislation, 
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the making of Law-Decrees and law-making in government decrees may be 
regarded as settled on the ground of constitutional provisions, their interpre-
tation and legislative practice. The situation may be better characterized so 
"that the structure (mechanism) of the highest-level legislative activity as laid 
down in the Constitution involved from the outset all the unsettled problems 
-which have been discussed in this work in connection with the position of the 
Soviet Presidium. The Constitution, its interpretation and the post-constitu-
tion legislative activity failed to draw a line of division between the powers 
of Parliament, the Presidium of the People's Republic and the government — 
although it is also true that the resulting contradictions were very soon 
recognized. Efforts at solving the problem were made likewise very soon. The 
provisions of Parliamentary Resolution No. 1 of 1956 are worthwhile to quote 
in this context: „The legal, public administrative and judicial Committee shall, 
with the cooperation of the appropriate State organs, draw up a proposal for 
issuing State enactments to concert, to appropriately divide the spheres of 
•activity of Parliament, the Presidium of the People's Republic and the Council 
of Ministers and it shall submit this proposal to Parliament not later than 
April 1, 1957." (Chapter V, clause 1). This part of the Resolution has not been 
implemented. (It may be noted that a recent edition of the collection of statutes 
in force omits this part of the resolution with the comment that it contains 
•out-of-date provisions). 
This range of problems arose again in the course of the preparation of 
the recent constitutional amendment. The wording of the constitutional amend-
ment, the fact that it did not alter the position and legal status of the 
Presidium, at least in respect to legislative powers, reflects that the institu-
tion of the Presidium has stood the test also in Hungary. Still, due to the fact 
i;hat the constitutional amendment did not change the provisions adopted in 
1949 the problem necessarily arises, to what an extent may a statute regulating 
-the legislative system, go beyond earlier solutions or, to put it in other words, 
do the 1949 provisions provide a framework wide enough for fur ther develop-
ing the institutions concerned for the legal formulation of the problems of a 
continued development. Or, should the proposals to be elaborated be conceived 
merely as recommendations which can continuously be implemented in the 
legislative policy but cannot be institutionalized in a highest-level special 
statute on legislative activity. It is more probable that the task to be performed 
is of a dual nature. There may proposals, recommendations be elaborated 
which may be institutionalized in statutes. (A Law-Decree eventually to be 
issued on the subject may have a relatively wide freedom of movement for 
— as has already been pointed out — the Presidium has powers, within its 
authority as substitute for Parliament, interpret in a Law-Decree also the 
Constitution. An Act-level statute might of course offer wider possibility.) 
On the other hand recommendations, proposals might be elaborated which 
might be implemented by organs in charge of legislative policy in the course 
•of the execution of the Law-Decree. 
What has been said also indicates that an abstract constrasting of Act and 
Law-Decree, or of legislative subjects and subjects to be regulated by Law-
Decrees or government decrees will not suffice when proposals will be elabo-
rated. Such an approach has become obsolete by now even in the legislative 
mechanism of bourgeois States which recognise the principle of the separation 
of powers. The less is it applicable in the system of institutions in the socialist 
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State organization which is based on the unity of State power. When the 
problem is raised and the answer is sought, it is the functions discharged by 
Parliament and the Presidium in the political mechanism as a whole and 
within this in the system of State organization which should be taken as a 
point of departure. The organizational and powers f ramework which concern 
the subject under discussion should serve the performance of these functions 
just as the proposals to be elaborated should contribute to a more efficient 
discharge of these functions. When this set of problems is examined f rom the 
general angle of the political mechanism the mistake of assuming decision-
making powers on the merits of matters, formalist, wanton institutions are 
forced even when it is a mat ter of simple transmissions, will not be committed. 
On the other hand if the special requirements and functions of State activity 
are borne in mind the danger tha t unnecessary formalism is meant to have 
been discovered in instances where really the specific methods and means of 
State activity appear, will be averted. The more so, because in such instances 
aspects of the organizational and arranging function of law are often, discer-
nible which are also the safeguards of State order, discipline and legal se-
curity. These special considerations- may have a special emphasis in such a 
phase of socialist construction when the principal task is not the abolishing 
of existing institutions but the stabilizing, strengthening, consolidating of 
already emerged (or at least emerged in their bases) socialist-type institutions, 
conditions. Otherwise it should not be ignored either that in the given scope 
of issues such a high sphere of State activity is examined where, in several 
instances, processes which may appear formal at first sight may have a 
material import. 
3. Under the recent constitutional amendment the place of the Presidium 
has been fixed for a long te rm in the State organization — at least in its 
principal traits. According to this amendment the socially more important 
function of the Presidium is to act as substitute for Parl iament between the 
latter 's sessions — constitutional amendments excepted. This of course does 
not preclude the extension of its other tasks falling within its so-called proper 
powers. Still, the nature of the Tresidium is primarily determined by the fact 
that, under the explicit provisions of the Constitution, it embodies popular 
sovereignty between the sessions of Parliament, it is the depositary of the 
exercise of supreme power. This statement also means tha t the role played by 
the Presidium in the political mechanism as a whole and its relationships to 
other elements of State organization, particularly Parl iament and government 
should be examined not on the ground of tasks discharged within its „proper 
powers" but on the ground of its powers as a substitute for Parliament. 
This statement will serve as a guide also in the legislative field. It is not 
a legislative function separated f rom the powers of Parliament, within the 
so-called head of State function (i.e. within the Presidium's proper powers) 
which should be shaped but the development perspective should be outlined 
having in mind the Presidium's substitutive powers and within This scope 
should be elaborated a) principles, recommendations to be observed in legis-
lative policy,", and b) institutions which may be laid down in statutes. . 
It should be pointed out at the outset that substitutive powers cover 
manifold tasks. In direct, legislation e.g. at least three distinct tasks may be 
distinguished (distinct as to. their basic traits). First, cases may be mentioned 
when the Presidium legislates in the course of the normal working of the 
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State — without amending Acts in force or making norms belonging explicitly 
to Act-making. The second group includes cases of legislation, which should 
be justified, when the Presidium adopts statutes, because of urgency, instead 
of Parliament. It amends e.g. some details of Acts in force between sessions 
of Parliament. Lastly, an entirely distinct special case of the Presidium's 
legislative activity is when it adopts statutes in a state of emergency or in 
time of war. Of the three cases the first two belong to the normal legislative 
mechanism. Accordingly, attention should be devoted first of all to problems 
coming- within this scope. 
'' 4. As far as Act-amending Law-Decrees are concerned the first problem 
to be dealt with is the justification of upholding this institution af ter the 
phase of rapid social changes characteristic of the initial stage of transition 
had come to an end. It is obviously impossible' in given cases to lay down in 
statutes solutions contrary to the Constitution recently amended. However, in 
principle, the elaboration of recommendations to be implemented in legislative 
•policy which would practically preclude the possibility of Act-amending by 
Law-Decrees might be conceived. This is however unnecessary. Under the 
present Parliamentary pattern which is based not on the continuous working 
of the plenary session and when the increasing of the frequency of the 
Parliamentary sessions is not envisaged, the rigid emphasis on a requirement 
that Acts must be amended always by Acts would result in an unjustif ied 
slowing down of the State's activity. It is to be feared that forcing such a 
solution would necessarily place into the foreground the introduction of the 
government's authorization. Accordingly, Act-amending Law-Decrees should 
in principle be upheld. On the other hand, there is possibility to define con-
ditions that this type of Law-Decrees should not be resorted to unless a 
necessity really prevails. 
The solution should probably be sought not in the negative but in the 
•positive direction. The principal issue in the given case is not a restriction of 
the Presidium's activity but the strengthening, developing of Parliament's 
role. First of all the mistaken but unfortunately quite inveterate view that a 
Parliamentary session is such a solemn act the dignity of which would not 
tolerate the discharge of such part-tasks like Act-amendment must be di-
spelled. The fact that Parliament is such a working organ which needs not 
only solemn but also everyday events should be brought home. The partial 
amendment of Acts might be solved during these „everydays". There is no 
obstacle whatever either in theory or practice to place on the agenda of a 
session several items of this type — perhaps in a simplified procedure. First 
of all, it should be made clear that amendment by Parliament is the normal 
procedure of Act-amending. In addition it should be indicated that Law-
Decrees may amend Acts in every case when the delay would involve parti-
cular difficulties in the leadership of the State. The obligation to substantiate 
urgency in such cases might be provided for. 
The elaboration of some principles of legislative policy, connected with 
certain types of legislative subjects might also be conceived. It might e.g. be 
laid down that the most important legislative subjects (those set forth in the 
Constitution or the momentuous Codes) should not be -amended by Law-
Decrees, save in exceptional cases. Some other conditions envisaging Act-
amending by Parliament might be set forth in a comprehensive statute re-
gulating problems of legislation. Particularly procedural rules which provide 
for the possibility of Act-amending by Law-Decrees, within constitutional 
limitations, might be susceptible of containing of such provisions. A regulation 
e.g. that before issuing such Law-Decrees the views of the Parliamentary 
Committee concerned should be solicited, its Chairman and rapporteur should 
be invited to the relevant session of the Presidium might also be conceived. 
Probably, no rigid rules are needed to achieve this end. It may happen namely 
that in cases, the urgency of which is justified, such a regulation would in-
volve difficulties. 
There are no obstacles in principle to make a distinction between Act-
amending Law-Decrees and other Law-Decrees when they are submitted to 
Parliament. Constitutional regulation does not preclude a special examination 
by the Parliamentary Committee concerned of such Law-Decrees which might 
be adopted separately. It is not precluded either that in such cases a one-
Section Act and its motivation should contain the provision on adoption but 
approval by Parliamentary resolution is in principle, likewise possible. 
It should also be indicated that provisions on details which are but the 
consequences of the amendment of merits is not invariably necessary in 
Parliamentary amendments. In such cases a solution that Parliament adopts 
only amendment of the merits leaving the details to the Presidium might also 
be conceivable. Thus e.g. the Presidium might law down the consolidated text 
of Acts. 
5. Otherwise the overwhelming majority of Law-Decrees do not amend 
Acts but are independent legislative acts. The greater part of these are based 
on Acts, in other words they provide for the important institutions of Acts 
applying to the main features of a legal domain which still comes within the 
scope of regulation by Acts. Such are e.g. Law-Decrees providing for educa-
tional institutions or co-operative types. In such Law-Decrees new legislation 
and provisions on the interpretation of the underlying Act are usually amal-
gamated. A great number of Law-Decrees contain original law in the strictest 
sense (primary legislation), which are in the place of Acts de facto and de 
iure: they are, so to speak, substitutes for Acts. Such are for instance the 
Law-Decrees on the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, on the system of scien-
tific degrees on public record offices, on expropriation etc. The probable 
course the development of . the legal material contained in such Law-Decrees 
will take is that it will gradually come under regulation by Acts, at a pace 
commensurate with the increased legislative activity of Parliament and the 
pace of the consolidation of institutions provided for in" such Law-Decrees. 
Parallel with this process the solution that the legal material regulated by a 
coherent category of Law-Decrees and ripe for a lasting regulation will be 
comprised in a Code setting forth general traits, as has been done in the 
Education Act or Cooperative Act and only part-rules regulating quickly 
changing institutions but still of a general concern will remain on the Law-
Decree level. Law-Decrees on e.g. the State direction of scientific researches, 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences the system of scientific degrees, scientific 
institutes and researchers may already be included within this category. Such 
and similar subjects serve as examples of such domains of regulation termed 
in the preceding pages, when examining legislative subjects, as legislative 
subjects „in their bases". The theoretical and technical moment of this distinc-
tion will very probably be growing in the present phase of socialist develop-
ment. It should also be pointed out that this is the very legislative field where 
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problems rooted in the lack of delimitation between the powers (or rather the 
functions) of the government and Presidium are already discernible. A survey 
of the development up to now may considerably contribute to outlining a 
solution. Only in the knowledge of the principal development trends is it 
possible to take a position to what an extent and under what conditions is the 
retention of the numerous hierarchical grades, characteristic of national legis-
lation, justified. 
a) In Hungarian legal development (as well as in European legal develop-
ment) there were no levels or grades in central legislation for a long time. It 
may safely be stated that the entire central legislation was built on a single 
grade: either on Acts or on decrees. In other words, Acts or decrees were 
alternatives in regulating subjects coming under regulation and they were not 
the inferior or superior levels of regulation built upon each other. It was only 
in the XIX t h century, or more exactly in the second half of . the century (in 
Hungary only at the end of the XIX t h century and at the beginning of the 
XX t h century) that two grades of written sources of law, Acts and decrees 
were taking root. (Decree as a statute, implementing an Act.) The powers of 
Decree-making, as was the case previously, belonged unequivocally to the 
head of the executive, the head of the State, who exercised' these powers 
through the minister accountable equally to him and to Parliament. It was 
only in exceptional cases that he acted directly but also in such instances the 
accountability of the responsible minister, who had to countersign the enact-
ment, prevailed. In Hungarian literature on public law at the end of the 
century, the categories of royal, government and ministerial decrees are 
treated almost as synonimous. The principal pattern of law-making decree 
based on Acts was the ministerial decree. But the minister issued decrees not 
within his proper powers but „acting within the powers" of the head of 
State, within powers delegated by the. latter. In this sense every minister was 
acting as an outward manifestation of the same dominant will. The homo-
geneity of government was secured in this system not by the collectivity of 
the government but by the fictitious conception that the powers of ministers 
are but the will of the head of State delegated in a divided form. This 
principle was the basis of the obligatory solidarity of ministers as well as of 
the unity of legislation. (It is another matter by what technique and by what 
methods did the government and ministries the implementation of unity in 
legislation in the working of ministries. 
The two-grade legislation came into being only by "stages. Parliamentary 
activity which was becoming increasingly continuous was capable, more or 
less, of keeping pace with the development and differentiation of social re-
lationships. Ministerial decrees issued in the execution of Acts (if such were 
issued at all) contained mainly technical instructions, guidance on working 
methods, addressed to the public administrative organization under the direc-
tion of the minister concerned. Decrees supplementing Acts with material 
provisions, providing for their details, then effecting citizens' rights and 
obligations came into being through several transitory forms. The practice 
that ministers subsequently published their individual decisions deemed . by 
them to contain matters of principle was introduced at a very early stage. By 
so doing, the ministers provided orientation not only for public administrative 
agencies under their control in regard to similar cases in the future, but 
served as an information also for the public. Such decisions became attached 
153 
to the norms laid down in Acts as an interpretation by the law-applying 
organ. In keeping with the growth of the minister-controlled public admi-
nistrative organization, the emergence of their grades, this practice was 
expanding and the content of such publications was considerably changed. 
Beside individual decisions containing certain matters of principle instructions 
which, together with the delegation of powers, provided orientation on the 
mode of handling matters, although remaining within the limits of Acts (at 
least in the sense that not running counter to Acts) prescribed special con-
ditions as to the application of several provisions of Acts, the indivual estab-
lishment of the existence or non-existence of rights or obligations laid down 
in Acts, became increasingly widespread. In reality, this was still a case of 
interpretation by the law-applying organ which, however, was leading gra-
dually to the issuing of Act-based new statutes. 
This trend of development was furthered by the fact that minister-
controlled public administrative agencies were so-called „deconcentrated" or-
gans. In other words, they had no powers of their own laid down in statutes. 
They acted in all matters within quasi-ministerial powers, (delegated by the 
minister). This meant that the minister (or ministerial departments and their 
heads) could order lower agencies to make decisions concretely determined 
by the central authority. But direct decision-making by the central organ on 
individual and incidental matters where the minister has usually delegated its 
powers in general terms, was not precluded by considerations of principle (or 
of statutory provisions). This meant furthermore, that delegation did not 
confer independent powers on these agencies which could not have been 
broken through by the minister in any concrete matter. The so-called middle-
grade organs had the same powers in regard to lower organs. As an example 
the county director of internal revenue should be pointed out- who had powers 
to act and to decide with complete independence as far as outward appearance 
was concerned in many and important cases. However, he had no powers at 
all vis-a-vis the minister of finance within the organization of treasury admi-
nistration. The minister had powers to decide on the merits of every case — 
e.g. the licences of village pubs. The same held for the district internal revenue 
office vis-a-vis the county director of internal revenue and the minister of 
finance. This also meant that a ministerial „decree" whether it concerned an 
individual matter or a law-making instruction had the nature of an uncon-
ditional order in regard to the organization under the minister's control, just 
as the chiefs of offices had in regard to lower-ranking officers. On the other 
hand, due to the „unity", of the executive mentioned earlier, decrees issued 
by any of the ministers were unconditionally binding on government-controlled 
public administrative organs. 
Also other factors contributed to the ministerial decrees becoming ge-
nerally binding normative acts, statutes. Thus e.g. the characteristic trait of 
ministerial accountability that the minister was accountable only for law-
infringing actions or omissions. In this way the issuing of decrees which 
remained within statutory limitations or went beyond these but were not 
explicitly unlawful, was not unconstitutional. These were binding on the 
courts and local self-government. But these were not „unconditional orders" 
in this field. Thus the decrees of the unified executive were implemented 
eventually in three, more or less distinct legislative domains. These were 
implemented in the deconcentrated public administrative organization in the 
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same manner as other service orders or instructions. Their relation to Acts 
could not be examined. The courts however, had powers to refuse to apply 
decrees if they deemed them to be contravening Acts. (It should be pointed 
out incidentally that these powers of the courts applied not only to decrees of 
implementation and were based not merely on Act No. IV of 1869 on the 
judiciary. These were shaped actually by customary law and were laid down 
as early as in Act No. XII of 1791. A particular system of decree implementa-
tion evolved in self-government administration. Parish and county town self-
governments were bound to execute decrees just as unconditionally as were 
the deconcentrated organs — Act No. XXII of 1886, Section 30; town and 
county municipalities, however, had powers to examine not only the lawfulness 
but also the applicability to local conditions (expediency) of decrees. As a 
consequence, they had rights of petition — petition could be made twice with 
a delaying effect, and a right of complaint to the Administrative Court against 
decrees deemed unlawful ; this action had likewise a delaying effect. If, 
however, an immediate execution of a decree would have jeopardized important 
State interests they were bound to execute it duly and could submit their 
observations subsequently to Parliament — Act No. XXI of 1886, Section 19; 
Act No. LX of 1907, Section 7). 
It should be pointed out that the problem of law-making ministerial 
decrees and their execution was examined in so much detail now was not 
only because they meant at that time the second legislative level. (Thus in 
this, but only in this sense they were analogous to the Law-Decrees of to-day) 
but also because the proper interpretation of the Presidium's constitutional 
supervision over the powers of local councils requires a survey of some 
constitutional safeguards of the earlier system of self-government. 
b) The shaping of the third level of central law-making was the appear-
ance of government decrees. At the outset the government as the „Council of 
Ministers" was merely a consultative body. Though, at the end of the 19 th 
century there was some legislation under which not only ministers bu t the 
Council of Ministers, as a body, was granted material powers. It is wor th 
noting that government decrees are mentioned as late as at the beginning of 
the second decade of the 20 th century (in a period af ter they had been issued 
several times and their distinction was justified) as a variant of the „simple" 
ministerial decree. Kálmán Molnár e.g. in his work, „Kormányrendeletek" 
(Government Decrees) uses the term government decree as a collective concept. 
He distinguishes three types of such decrees according to the organ issuing 
them: a) royal decrees, i.e. decrees signed by the king and countersigned by a 
minister; b) ministerial decrees issued by virtue of royal decision (decrees 
issued by the minister by royal order); c) simple ministerial decrees (issued 
by the minister on his own decision). Decrees issued jointly by several minis-
ters are included within this category; these are different f rom decrees issued 
by a single minister insofar that „decrees issued jointly by several ministers 
(signed by all of them) cannot be amended or repealed but jointly by the 
issuing ministers". Essentially, Council of Ministers' decrees are regarded as 
analogous because all • ministers have a share in issuing such decrees. But it 
is also emphasized that Council of Ministers decrees have „distinct subjects 
defined in Acts". The observation that such decrees may be issued wi thout a 
special authorization under Acts of the Council of Ministers „in matters which, 
due to their universal import concern every ministerial department or have 
an impact of the position of the government as a whole", indicate the 
extending practice of issuing Council of Ministers' decrees.46 
The government decree, as distinct f rom the ministerial decree and placed 
oii -a hierarchically higher level of the sources of law stroke root eventually 
as a result of authorizations connected with the state of emergency or time 
of war. Already Act No. LXIII of 1912 on the state of emergency conferred 
special powers not on single ministers, not on the head of the State, but on 
the government. „In t ime of war, and if necessary, even in case of a threat 
of war, when mili tary preparat ions are ordered the ministry, all of its members 
being responsible, may resort to the special powers defined in this Act to the 
necessary extent" — runs Section I (a) of the Act. It was again the govern-
ment on which the authorizations connected with the so-called economic re-
habilitation in the 'twenties (Act No. IV of 1924) then the economic and f inan-
cial authorizations gr-anted continuously in the 'thirties were conferred. 
The peak of authorizations was reached in Act No. II of 1939 (Defence 
Act) by conferring practically unlimited authorizations on the government: 
(the government) "may take measures by decrees coming within 
public administrative, private law, procedural and legislative authority, which 
are indispensable in defence interests in situations created by special condi-
tions and may, for this end, lay down provisions at variance with Acts in 
force" — runs Section 141 (2) of the Act.47 
The government decree comprised, on the one hand, legal material coming 
within regulation by Acts, on the other hand it covered statutes belonging to 
the level of ministerial decrees in matters where, in consequence of inter-
relationships, the necessity of issuing enactments at variance with Acts in 
force has arisen. As regards its outward form, government decree was also 
published as a ministerial, the Prime Minister's decree. Else the Prime Mi-
nister issued decrees within his proper powers in administrative domains 
where he exercised direct supervision (e.g. statistical administration). 
It has already been indicated that in the post-1945 period special author-
izations contributed to the widening of the government 's decree-making 
powers. The periods of transition in which other variants, beside the known 
institution of the government decree, augmented government-level law-making 
should be pointed out. In the period between 1946 and 1948 the orders of the 
Supreme Economic Council, then between 1949 and 1951 some resolutions of 
the People's Economic Council appeared »as sources of law placed between the 
government decree and the ministerial decree. Between 1951 and 1952, although 
for a short time, ministers did not issue decrees and, in principle, the functions 
of the ministerial decrees were taken over by government decrees. (This 
meant in practice a swelling in the number of both the government decrees 
46 cf.: Molnár, K.: Kormányrendeletek (Government Decrees). Eger, 1911. p. 
20 et seq. 
47 The authorization precluded only the amendment of the organization of the 
supreme State power and the system of local governments; in addition, a special 
authorization was required to amend substantive criminal law provisions. Otherwise 
such decrees had to be submitted to the 36-Member Committee, which had right 
to ask the government to provide information, to propose the calling of Parliament. 
The Committee's decision however had no effect on the execution of the Decrees 
issued. (The Committee's. 24 members were elected by the House of Deputies, 12 
members by the Upper House, from among their respective members. It was 
working on the model of the House of Deputy Committees.) 
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and instructions.) The endeavours aimed at replacing, in given cases, by 
government resolutions vand their publication government decrees even w h e n 
the subject coming under regulation should obviously be regulated by a 
decree, indicate the augmentation of the forms of government-level l aw-
making. 
c) Not taking into account transitional fo rms and examining sources of 
law functioning at present at may be concluded tha t over a period hardly 
longer than a century the originally one-level central law-making ramified 
esentially into a six-grade law-making. 
As it is to-day, three grades of legal sources comprise the legal mater ial 
coming essentially within Act-level regulation: Act, the Law-Decree and, in 
part, the government decree. If the ministerial regulation d r a w n wi thin t he 
ambit of government decrees is not considered, it will be found tha t the field 
regulated earlier by ministerial decrees may be divided into at least th ree 
grades. In other words: the ministerial decree has been retained; the insti-
tution of normative instructions has survived unchanged (to simplify mat te r s 
instruction by Secretaries of State are included within this category); in 
addition, interpretation by the law-applying organs, — i.e. the positions 
adopted by ministries — which is susceptible to raise doubts in respect of the 
actual provisions of ministerial decrees and instructions has again come to 
occupy its place or perhaps it is even being increasingly extended. When 
describing the grades, the special ¡acts which mean the introduction of addi-
tional levels into the material of some legal branches (e.g. labour law, f inancial 
law) were deliberately omitted. 
Attention should repeatedly be drawn to the fact that a differentiat ion of 
the levels *and grades of law-making is essentially a necessary process and is 
but a consequence of the differentiation which, due to-changes in the role of 
the State is reflected in the development of the methods and means of legal 
regulation. Still, the extent to which grades had been growing cannot be so 
unequivocally approved. It is not certain either whether the random practice 
in making use of various levels >and grades can be justified. In respect of 
certain subjects one or, at most, two levels of statutes contain the directly 
applicable rules, while in other instances law-applying organs must take into 
account all the criteria of legal regulation in finding the Law in force. In all 
probability law-making methods which make possible that the grades of 
regulation be diminished compared to the situation as it is to-day, in respect 
of a considerable major i ty of subjects to be regulated, can be worked out. 
This is particularly important in legal domains which directly affect citizens' 
rights and obligations. 
d) In this context the feasibility of reducing regulation levels will be dealt 
with only in one respect, namely the legislative activity of the Presidium and 
the government. It is likely that no result can be expected f rom a negative 
approach of the problem. Accordingly, the topic to be examined is not f rom 
what forms or fields of legislation should the Presidium or the government be 
kept off or prohibited. Instead, having in mind the principal functions of both 
organs, with a view to fur ther ing a more efficient discharge of these principal 
functions, the possibilities of development perspectives should be outlined. 
The principal functions of the Presidium have already been dealt with. 
If the government 's principal functions are to be formulated, the recent 
constitutional amendment will serve as a guide. This constitutional amendment 
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affected the Council of Ministers' powers and duties in several respects. Ge-
neralizing practical experience gained during the development after the adop-
tion of the 1949 Constitution, the government is not termed as the supreme-
public administrative organ but the so-called governing activities are placed 
into the foreground of its activity. This means that the constitutional amend-
ment strongly emphasized the difference between the government and the 
supreme organs of specialized administrative branches. The government is not 
a super-ministry under collective leadership, but the principal organ of the 
general management and direction of State work. The first place among its 
duties came to be occupied by the formulation of State policy and the securing: 
of the realization, highest everyday direction and organization of this policy. 
In the new wording of the Constitution the protection of State and social, 
order, the securing of citizens' rights is in the first place among the Council of 
Ministers' duties. Under conditions in the socialist State this means not only 
a formal, i.e. legal securing of rights but comprises the care for material, 
guarantees necessary for their actual realization. The constitutional amend-
ment laid down the Council of Ministers' powers and duties already in 
accordance with this higher requirement. Unlike, the earlier formulation, the-
Council of Ministers shall be responsible not merely „for the implementation 
of the national economic plans", but also for the „elaboration of the national 
economic plans". In addition, the Council of Ministers shall determine the-
trends of development in science and culture, the system of health and social 
services, shall attend to providing the necessary funds. The Council of Mi-
nisters' function in foreign policy is likewise emphasized as a new element in. 
the constitutional amendment. Otherwise the leading role of the government, 
in the elaboration of State policy is set forth • in the constitutional amendment, 
also in other respects. 
By providing for [Section 19 (3)] the discussion on and approval of the-
government's programme as coming within Parliament's powers it imposed, 
although in an indirect form, the duty on the government to formulate a. 
guiding programme for a period for the State work as a whole. 
All this goes to show that the Council of Ministers has an unchanged key 
role in transforming the policy of the Marxist—Leninist Party into State-
policy in the State organization, in formulating and in elaborating concrete 
tasks, means, methods and processes which enable the State organization, the 
basic tool of socialist construction to serve best the realization of this policy. 
The leading role of the highest organ of the Party has of course a direct 
effect also on the work of Parliament and the Presidium since the possibility 
of direct contact between central Party organs and government-controlled 
State agencies is not (and cannot) be precluded. But the government's tasks as 
laid down in the Constitution indicate that it is the government which is the 
organ within the State organization with which these contacts are the closest. 
The Council of Ministers, when working out State policy relies, beside the-
Party's directives, also on information obtained from the entire field of State-
and. social activity. 
The Council of Ministers discharges its tasks following from Acts, Law-
Decrees adopted by the supreme representative bodies, from their resolutions 
and from its own enactments obviously not directly but by relying on the-
entire State organization. This is done mainly by directing, coordinating and 
controlling its subordinate organs. In addition, the Council of Ministers takes-
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in to account the fact that agencies not under its control discharge tasks 
incumbent upon them by virtue of the Constitution, Acts and other statutes 
observing the objectives formulated by the government. This statement applies 
also to the judiciary and the procuracy. The government may usually make 
.proposals, recommendations to agencies not under its control. Besides, it may 
entrust organs of procuracy with the performance of specific tasks. But, 
•usually, it may mould judicial law application periodically by laying down 
^principles of the policy of law application. It may initiate actions with supreme 
representative organs in instances when the actions to be taken exceed its 
powers. The government, while discharging its own functions, cooperates with 
the social organs concerned. 
The government's participation in national legislation should be placed 
within this framework. When the problem is so approached it becomes obvious 
that the government's tasks in legislation are not limited to issuing govern-
m e n t decrees. It may be stated without exaggeration that the scope of duties 
discharged by the government in initiating the introduction of Bills, draf t 
Law-Decrees, in examining such drafts and Bills and in preparing them for 
Parl iamentary discussionis much more significant than the adoption of decrees. 
•Otherwise the government's increased role in preparing legislative actions has 
become a world phenomenon by now. The overwhelming majority of Bills is 
.prepared by the government in every State and they are adopted as proposed 
by the government. In socialist States it is obvious that it is only the govern-
ment which has sufficient information not only for the preparation of Bills 
but it is in a position, during the Parliamentary discussion, to provide infor-
mation, as the representative of overall social interests, on the justification of 
the Bill and the possible novel provisions contained in it. It is again another 
matter, which concerns legislative technics, to what an extent does the govern-
m e n t rely on ministries in the preparation of Bills and motions, on its own 
staff, on committees working as direct government organs and the ministries 
.specialised for preparing legislation, i.e. the Ministry of Justice. 
In addition to initiating the introduction of Bills and Law-Decrees the 
government has significant potential powers in connection with the issuing of 
ministerial decrees. „The ministers head, -in accordance with statutory pro-
visions and the Council of Ministers' Resolutions the public administrative 
departments under their authority and direct the organs under their control" 
— so runs the Constitution. This means that the ministers are controlled by 
the Council of Ministers in their entire activity, decree-making included. The 
.government has therefore powers to adopt a resolution in every instance when 
deemed necessary, on the issuing of ministerial decrees. In such instances the 
•Council of Ministers may determine the limits or even details held essential 
by it of the decrees to be issued. 
Lastly, it is a very important power of the Council of Ministers that it 
m a y coordinate, control the merits of the legislative activity of the entire 
State apparatus, the ministers included. It may examine the expediency, the 
legality of decrees, it may repeal, reverse such decrees. It has powers to 
•exercise preliminary or subsequent control. (It has powers,. in principle, to 
•order the preliminary presentation of all draft ministerial decrees.) 
e) After what has been expounded the proposals on the delimitation of 
the legislative activities of the Presidium of the People's Republic and the 
Council of Ministers may be so summed up. 
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The solution which emphasizes the importance of governing functions in 
the Council of Ministers activity appears to be the most obvious, in other 
words : in the domains-coming within the powers of the Council of Ministers 
the elaboration and determination of State policy, the guidance of ministries 
in matters of principle, its coordination and control; in matters exceeding the 
government's powers, taking initiative with the supreme representative bodies 
for taking appropriate action. It the level of government activity would be so 
raised it would automatically involve a diminishing in the government 's direct 
legislative activity. The regulation of matters of general concern would be on 
Act-level legislation, in accordance with the principles described before: a 
regulation deemed to be lasting and stable would come within the ambit of 
Acts; matters, qualified as pertaining to Acts but subject to more rapid 
changes would be regulated by Law-Decrees. Regulation not affecting general 
interests, i.e. of a branch significance would be performed by ministerial 
decrees. It is in the f irst place the government's initiating, directing, co-
ordinating and controlling role which would be strengthened in the govern-
ment 's legislative activity. This presupposes the efficient functioning of a 
control mechanism — also on government level — which would be capable of 
securing that rules coming within regulation by Acts, Law-Decrees or govern-
ment decrees should not be included in ministerial decrees. 
As it is seen; all this does not mean that the possibility of issuing govern-
ment decrees should be precluded. This means only the outlining of trends 
which may serve as an orientation for legislative policy. The retention of the 
possibility that the government should have powers to issue decrees in every 
instance when it deems it necessary to more efficiently discharge the tasks 
incumbent on it is fully compatible with this concept. Every idea attempting 
to restrict by legal or constitutional means the government in the exercise of 
these powers would be mistaken on a point of principle. 
6. In addition to the issuing of Law-Decrees several tasks concerning 
central legislation come within the Presidium's powers. In the first place 
duties connected with the control of constitutionality and law interpretation 
•should be mentioned within this scope. 
a) The scope of duties relating to the control of constitutionality is 
manifold. The Presidium has in this domain substitutive and proper powers. 
The control of constitutionality relating to the organization and working of 
the councils displays special features within its proper powers. 
As regards tasks coming within its substitutive powers several constitu-
tional provisions relate to Parliament 's responsibility in protecting constitu-
tionality on the highest level. Under Section 19 (2): „Parliament shall secure 
the constitutional order of society". Under Section 19 (3) (1) Parl iament „shall 
•control the observance of the Constitution, shall repeal acts of State organs 
violating the Constitution or infringing the interests of society". The Presidium, 
acting within its proper powers, „shall guard over the implementation of the 
Constitution and shall repeal or reverse statutes, public administrative deci-
sions or acts which violate the Constitution". [Section 30 (2)]. 
I think it will be worthwhile to point out briefly the difference between 
the two constitutional provisions. Parliament 's powers of supervision are 
wider. These comprise the entire State organization and point, in addition to 
the duty of observing the Constitution, to the general interests of society. The 
Presidium's proper powers are more restricted, since they extend only to acts 
of public administrative organs and statutes and are more closely l inked to-
the Constitution. In addition not only the „observance" of the constitution b u t 
also its „implementation" is emphasized. In other words it is not only a 
protection against explicit constitution-violating actions which is envisaged 
but protection is offered also against omissions which impede the realization, 
practical implementation of the Constitution. Accordingly, the Pres idium is 
bound to at tend to the enactment of all the statutes which are indispensable 
for the implementation of the Constitution. The government, laying down t h e 
Presidium's powers following f rom the constitutionality supervision over the 
councils, cedes the protection of the councils' r ights to the Presidium. T h e 
Protection of the councils' rights means the protection of the r ights of the 
councils as representative organs. Under this constitutional tenet the Pres idium 
has powers to reverse or repeal a) individual acts infringing the independent 
powers of councils as set for th in statutes and b) every statute which ann i -
hilates or impairs the councils' powers as set for th in the Constitution and 
statutes. The latter right of the Presidium constitutes a part of the system of 
institutions protecting the constitutionality of legislation. 
Several problems, which have not been clarified up to now, m a y b e 
raised in connection with the Presidium's powers of supervision over t h e 
constitutionality of legislation. A few general problems will be discussed now 
in this context. 
It should be made clear first of all whether the powers of supervision 
over the constitutionality of legislation with which the Presidium is vested is 
to be conceived a preliminary or subsequent supervision. It is obvious tha t 
this is a case, of subsequent supervision; the Presidium may examine the 
constitutionality of a statute only af ter it has been enacted. The feasibility 
of a preliminary supervision might be raised only in one instance, in connec-
tion with draf t Acts or Bills submitted to Parl iament. Several socialist cons-
titutions namely recognize such powers of organs which are similar to the 
Presidium. In all probability this is unnecessary in Hungary. Par l iament should 
continue to exercise its functions relating to this task. It should be f i rs t of all 
the Legal Committee of Parliament which should be vested with powers of 
supervision over the constitutionality of Bills. In respect to other statutes t he 
Presidium is bound, when discharging subsequent supervision, to act ex officio 
if it f inds that the constitution has been infringed. It may have a knowledge 
of infringements of the Constitution through the channels of the Citizens' 
informal right of complaint or through notices of public interest. In addition-, 
however, some procedural questions ought to be settled also in this domain. 
Thus, e.g. the cases when the Presidium is bound to decide on the meri ts and 
to give an answer to proposals, notices brought to its knowledge might be 
determined. It might be laid down e.g. that the Presidium is bound to decide 
on the merits of notices brought to its knowledge by the Procurator-General , 
the. Supreme Court or its President, the centers of major social organizations 
and the councils acting as bodies. Its procedure might also be regulated. (The 
Presidium itself will examine the case or will enlist the services of experts, 
will form committees or will rely on the Par l iamentary committee concerned 
or the Legal Committee.) 
b) Unlike other socialist constitutions, the Hungarian Constitution does 
not provide for the Presidium's powers in the field of law interpretation. This 
is accounted for by the fact that the Hungarian Presidium has general 
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•substitutive powers in the place of Parl iament (constitutional amendment 
•excluded). Accordingly its legislative powers are so wide that a particular 
provision on its powers in the domain of law interpretation was not deemed 
to be necessary. The Presidium is namely vested with the right of the binding 
interpretation of Acts by virtue of its proper powers respectively of its 
-substitutive powers, without particular constitutional provisions, between 
Parl iamentary sessions and, the right of interpreting Law-Decrees issued by 
itself, also during Parl iamentary sessions. All this is not tantamount to stating 
that a high-level statute on the preparation, forms and legislative powers could 
not explicitly provide for the Presidium's powers in the field of Act or, in 
.general, law interpretation. Such a regulation would contribute to the stability 
•of Acts. It should not be ignored either that the guiding principles and 
decisions on matters of principle adopted and issued by the Supreme Court 
cannot be substitutes for such activity of the Presidium. These bind namely 
only the judiciary and not the State apparatus as a whole and are therefore 
not qualified as generally binding acts of law interpretation. 
Otherwise when the Presidium's powers in law interpretation are laid 
down, provision on its powers on Act interpretation would suffice. A reference 
to the highest-level source of law would express completely the Presidium's 
powers in law interpretation. The question might be raised this notwithstand-
ing, tha t this formulation would not cover the interpretation of the Constitu-
tion. But there is no need to formulate within such a wide scope the Presi-
dium's law interpreting powers. The less so, because the Presidium is vested 
with such powers, to the extent necessary to discharge its functions within 
the limits of the functions devolving upon it f rom the protection of cons-
ti tutionality. But wheri so acting the Presidium is not a legislator but a law-
applying organ. In other words the Presidium has no powers to issue acts 
specially on the interpretation of the Constitution but, when deciding in 
concrete cases in the course of protecting constitutionality and legality it 
necessarily also interpretes the Constitution. 
When laying down the powers in the domain of Act-interpretation certain 
problems of procedure should also be settled, among others the right of 
initiative. It is obvious that the Presidium may at any time take the initiative 
to issue an interpretation. In addition, this r ight could be secured also for the 
Supreme Court, the Procurator-General and the Council of Ministers. The 
Council of Ministers has, in fact, such powers to-day. The Council of Mi-
nisters has namely the right to initiate the preparation of Bills, which right 
comprises also taking initiative in Act interpretation. Furthermore, the fo rm 
of interpretation might also be settled. The Presidium has the right to-day 
to issue interpretation in the form either of Law-Decree or normative resolu-
tion. These forms have stood the test. Whatever form is resorted to by the 
Presidium the generally binding law-interpreting acts should always be 
published.48 
Surveying the Presidium's functions in the central mechanism of legisla-
t ion and prospective developments, how the problem that the wide powers the 
Presidium has within its substitutive authori ty can affect the relationship 
48 The law interpreting powers of the Presidium are discussed in detail by 
Szabó, I.: A jogszabályok értelmezése (Interpretation of statutes). Budapest, 1960. 
p. 494 et seq. 
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between Parliament and the Presidium and to what extent can these have a n 
impact on the Presidium's relationship to the political mechanism conceived 
in the wider sense, should also be discussed. The question arises: by what is 
it accounted for that the Presidium's forms of activity have remained essen-
tially unchanged since 1949. Its relationships to the political mechanism as a 
whole and Parliament (its organs working between its sessions) have not been 
expanding either. The question can obviously not be answered by stat ing 
simply that the Presidium or similar organs have no historical roots in t h e 
country. 
When discussing the kindred institutions in people's democratic countries 
and the Soviet Union the more or less general trend that in these countries 
the recognition (or widening) of the substitutive powers was accompanied, in 
general, with the increased emphasis on and strengthening of relations between 
Presidium-type organs and the supreme representative bodies, the growing of 
Presidiums into some sort of small Parliaments, has already been referred to. 
This applies obviously not only to the organization and working methods b u t 
involves consequences as regards the forms in which this activity is discharged. 
When describing the work of the Supreme Soviet's Presidium it has been 
indicated that this development does not necessarily imply- changes in earlier 
constitutional patterns. The Supreme Soviets' Presidium remoulded its activity 
without a formal constitutional amendment. 
It is clear that initial steps have been made to establish closer relationships 
between Parliament and the Presidium. The amended standing orders of 
Parliament provide possibility for the Presidium to solicite the views when 
preparing Law-Decrees, the Parliamentary committee concerned. Still, proposals 
on the gradual harmonization of the Presidium's forms of activity, its working 
methods, with the important functions discharged by the Presidium in i ts 
substitutive powers are awaiting fur ther elaboration. 
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